Correction, Justice, Righteous Rule, Fear of Man, and Trust in the Lord

Pro 29:6 6 In the transgression of the wicked man lies a snare; But the righteous rejoiceth jubelt and is glad. Thus the first line is to be translated according to the sequence of the accents, Mahpach , Munach , Munach , Athnach , for the second Munach is the transformation of Dechi; אישׁ רע thus, like אנשׁי־רע, Pro 28:5, go together, although the connection is not, like this, genitival, but adjectival.

But there is also this sequence of the accents, Munach , Dechi , Munach , Athnach , which separates רע and אישׁ. According to this, Ewald translates: “in the transgression of one lies an evil snare;” but in that case the word ought to have been מוקשׁ רע, as at Pro 12:13; for although the numeral רבים sometimes precedes its substantive, yet no other adjective ever does; passages such as Isa 28:21 and Isa 10:30 do not show the possibility of this position of the words.

In this sequence of accents the explanation must be: in the wickedness of a man is the evil of a snare, i. e. , evil is the snare laid therein (Böttcher); but a reason why the author did not write מוקשׁ רע would also not be seen there, and thus we must abide by the accentuation אישׁ רע. The righteous also may fall, yet he is again raised by means of repentance and pardon; but in the wickedness of a bad man lies a snare into which having once fallen, he cannot again release himself from it, Pro 24:16.

In the second line, the form ירוּן, for ירן, is defended by the same metaplastic forms as ישׁוּד, Psa 91:6; ירוּץ, Isa 42:4; and also that the order of the words is not ישׂמח ורנּן (lxx ἐν χαρᾷ καὶ ἐν εὐθροσύνῃ; Luther: frewet sich und hat wonne [rejoices and has pleasure]), is supported by the same sequence of ideas, Zec 2:1-13 :14, cf. Jer 31:7 : the Jubeln is the momentary outburst of gladness; the Freude gladness, however, is a continuous feeling of happiness.

To the question as to what the righteous rejoiceth over [ jubelt ] and is glad [ greuet ] because of, the answer is not: because of his happy release from danger (Zöckler), but: because of the prosperity which his virtue procures for him (Fleischer). But the contrast between the first and second lines is not clear and strong. One misses the expression of the object or ground of the joy.

Cocceius introduces into the second line a si lapsus fuerit . Schultens translates, justus vel succumbens triumphabit , after the Arab. rân f. o. , which, however, does not mean succumbere , but subigere ( vid . , under Psa 78:65). Hitzig compares Arab. raym f. i. , discedere, relinquere , and translates: “but the righteous passeth through and rejoiceth. ” Böttcher is inclined to read יראה ושׂמח, he sees it (what?)

and rejoiceth. All these devices, however, stand in the background compared with Pinsker’s proposal ( Babylon. -Heb. Punktationssystem , p. 156): “On the footsteps of the wicked man lie snares, But the righteous runneth and is glad,” i. e. , he runneth joyfully (like the sun, Psa 19:6) on the divinely-appointed way (Psa 119:132), on which he knows himself threatened by no danger.

The change of בפשׁע into בפשׂע has Pro 12:13 against it; but ירוץ may be regarded, after Pro 4:12, cf. Pro 18:10, as the original from which ירון is corrupted.

Pro 29:7 7 The righteous knoweth the cause of the poor, But the godless understandeth no knowledge. The righteous knoweth and recogniseth the righteous claims of people of low estate, i. e. , what is due to them as men, and in particular cases; but the godless has no knowledge from which such recognition may go forth (cf. as to the expression, Pro 19:25). The proverb begins like Pro 12:10, which commends the just man’s compassion to his cattle; this commends his sympathy with those who are often treated as cattle, and worse even than cattle.

The lxx translates 7b twice: the second time reading רשׁ instead of רשׁע, it makes nonsense of it.

Pro 29:8 8 Men of derision set the city in an uproar, But wise men allay anger. Isa. 28 shows what we are to understand by אנשׁי לצון: men to whom nothing is holy, and who despise all authority. The Hiphil יפיחוּ does not signify irretiunt , from פּחח ( Venet . παγιδιοῦσι, after Kimchi, Aben Ezra, and others), but sufflant , from פוח (Rashi: ילהיבו): they stir up or excite the city, i.

e. , its inhabitants, so that they begin to burn as with flames, i. e. , by the dissolution of the bonds of mutual respect and of piety, by the letting loose of passion, they disturb the peace and excite the classes of the community and individuals against each other; but the wise bring it about that the breathings of anger that has broken forth, or is in the act of breaking forth, are allayed.

The anger is not that of God, as it is rendered by Jerome and Luther, and as יפיחו freely translated might mean. The Aram. err in regard to יפיחו in passages such as Pro 6:19.

Pro 29:9 9 If a wise man has to contend with a fool, He the fool rageth and laugheth, and hath no rest. Among the old translators, Jerome and Luther take the “wise man” as subject even of the second line, and that in all its three members: vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur sive reideat, non inveniet requiem . Thus Schultens, C. B. Michaelis, Umbreit, Ewald, Elster, and also Fleischer: “The doubled Vav is correlative, as at Exo 21:16; Lev 5:3, and expresses the perfect sameness in respect of the effect, here of the want of effect.

If the wise man, when he disputes with a fool, becomes angry, or jests, he will have no rest, i. e. , he will never bring it to pass that the fool shall cease to reply; he yields the right to him, and thus makes it possible for him to end the strife. ” But the angry passion, and the bursts of laughter alternating therewith, are not appropriate to the wise man affirming his right; and since, after Ecc 9:17, the words of the wise are heard בּנחח, the ואין נחת [and there is no rest] will cause us to think of the fool as the logical subject.

So far correctly, but in other respects inappropriately, the lxx ἀνὴρ σοφὸς κρινεῖ ἔθνη (after the expression עם, i. e. , עם, instead of את), ἀνὴρ δὲ φαῦλος (which אישׁ אויל does not mean) ὀργιζόμενος καταγελᾶται καὶ οὐ καταπτήσσει (as if the words were ולא יחת). The syntactical relation would be simpler if נשׁפּט in 9a were vocalized as a hypothetical perfect.

But we read for it the past נשׁפּט. Ewald designates 9a as a conditional clause, and Hitzig remarks that the Lat. viro sapiente disceptante cum stulto corresponds therewith. It marks, like 1Sa 2:13; Job 1:16, the situation from which there is a departure then with perf. consec . : if a wise man in the right is in contact with a fool, he starts up, and laughs, and keeps not quiet (supply לּו as at Pro 28:27), or (without לו): there is no keeping quiet, there is no rest.

The figure is in accordance with experience. If a wise man has any controversy with a fool, which is to be decided by reasonable and moral arguments, then he becomes boisterous and laughs, and shows himself incapable of quietly listening to his opponent, and of appreciating his arguments.

Pro 29:10 We now group together Pro 29:10-14. Of these, Pro 29:10 and Pro 29:11 are alike in respect of the tense used; Pro 29:12-14 have in common the pronoun pointing back to the first member. 10 Men of blood hate the guiltless And the upright; they attempt the life of such The nearest lying translation of the second line would certainly be: the upright seek his soul (that of the guiltless).

In accordance with the contrasted ישׂנאו, the Aram. understand the seeking of earnest benevolent seeking, but disregarding the נפשׁ in לנפשׁו; Symmachus (ἐπιζητήσουσι), Jerome ( quaerunt ), and Luther thus also understand the sentence; and Rashi remarks that the phrase is here לשׁון חבּה, for he rests; but mistrusting himself, refers to 1Sa 21:1-15 :23. Ahron b.

Josef glosses: to enter into friendship with him. Thus, on account of the contrast, most moderns, interpreting the phrase sensu bono , also Fleischer: probi autem vitam ejus conservare student . The thought is, as Pro 12:6 shows, correct; but the usus loq . protests against this rendering, which can rest only on Psa 142:5, where, however, the poet does not say אין דּורשׁ נפשׁי, but, as here also the usus loq .

requires, לנפשׁי. There are only three possible explanations which Aben Ezra enumerates: (1) they seek his, the bloody man’s, soul, i. e. , they attempt his life, to take vengeance against him, according to the meaning of the expressions as generally elsewhere, used, e. g. , at Psa 63:10; (2) they revenge his, the guiltless man’s, life (lxx ἐκζητήσουσιν), which has fallen a victim, after the meaning in which elsewhere only בּקּשׁ דּם and דּרשׁ נפשׁ, Gen 9:5, occur.

This second meaning also is thus not in accordance with the usage of the words, and against both meanings it is to be said that it is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs to think of the ישׁרים [the upright, righteous] as executors of the sentences of the penal judicature. There thus remains the interpretation (3): the upright - they (the bloody men) seek the soul of such an one.

The transition from the plur. to the sing. is individualizing, and thus the arrangement of the words is like Gen 47:21 : “And the people (as regards them), he removed them to the cities,” Gesen. §145. 2. This last explanation recommends itself by the consideration that תם and ישׁרים are cognate as to the ideas they represents-let one call to mind the common expression תּם וישׁר [perfect and upright, e.

g. , Job 1:1; Job 2:3], - that the same persons are meant thereby, and it is rendered necessary by this, that the thought, “bloody men hate the guiltless,” is incomplete; for the same thing may also be said of the godless in general. One expects to hear that just against the guiltless, i. e. , men walking in their innocence, the bloody-mindedness of such men is specially directed, and 10b says the same thing; this second clause first brings the contrast to the point aimed at.

Lutz is right in seeking to confute Hitzig, but he does so on striking grounds.

Pro 29:11 11 All his wrath the fool poureth out; But the wise man husheth it up in the background. That רוּחו is not meant here of his spirit (Luther) in the sense of quaecunque in mente habet (thus e. g. , Fleischer) the contrast shows, for ישׁבּחנּה does not signify cohibet , for which יחשׁכנּה (lxx ταμιεύεται) would be the proper word: רוּח thus is not here used of passionate emotion, such as at Pro 16:31; Isa 25:4; Isa 33:11.

שׁבּח is not here equivalent to Arab. sabbah, αἰνεῖν (Imman. , Venet . , and Heidenheim), which does not supply an admissible sense, but is equivalent to Arab. sabbakh, to quiet (Ahron b. Josef: קטפיאון = καταπαύειν), the former going back to the root-idea of extending ( amplificare ), the latter to that of going to a distance, putting away: sabbakh, procul recessit, distitit , hence שׁבּח, Psa 89:10, and here properly to drive off into the background, synon.

השׁיב (Fleischer). But בּאחור (only here with ב) is ambiguous. One might with Rashi explain: but the wise man finally, or afterwards (Symmachus, ἐπ ̓ ἐσχάτων; Venet . κατόπιν = κατόπισθε), appeaseth the anger which the fool lets loose; i. e. , if the latter gives vent to his anger, the former appeases, subdues, mitigates it (cf. בּאחרנה, לאחור, Isa 42:23). But it lies still nearer to refer the antithesis to the anger of the wise man himself; he does not give to it unbridled course, but husheth it in the background, viz.

, in his heart. Thus Syr. and Targ. reading בּרעינא, the former, besides יחשּׁבנּה ( reputat eam ), so also Aben Ezra: in the heart as the background of the organ of speech. Others explain: in the background, afterward, retrorsum , e. g. , Nolde, but to which compescit would be more appropriate than sedat . Hitzig’s objection, that in other cases the expression would be בּקרבּו, is answered by this, that with באחור the idea of pressing back (of אחוּר) is connected.

The order of the words also is in favour of the meaning in recessu ( cordis ). Irae dilatio mentis pacatio (according to an old proverb).

Pro 29:12 12 A ruler who listens to deceitful words, All his servants are godless. They are so because they deceive him, and they become so; for instead of saying the truth which the ruler does not wish to hear, they seek to gain his favour by deceitful flatteries, misrepresentations, exaggerations, falsehoods. Audita rex quae praecipit lex . He does not do this, as the saying is, sicut rex ita grex (Sir. 10:2), in the sense of this proverb of Solomon.

Pro 29:13 13 The poor man and the usurer meet together - Jahve lighteneth the eyes of both. A variation of Pro 22:2, according to which the proverb is to be understood in both of its parts. That אישׁ תּככים is the contrast of רשׁ, is rightly supposed in Temura 16b; but Rashi, who brings out here a man of moderate learning, and Saadia, a man of a moderate condition (thus also the Targ.

גּברא מצעיא, after Buxtorf, homo mediocris fortunae ), err by connecting the word with תּוך. The lxx δανειστοῦ καὶ χρεωφειλέτου (ἀλλήλοις συνελθόντων), which would be more correct inverted, for אישׁ תככים is a man who makes oppressive taxes, high previous payments of interest; the verbal stem תּכך, Arab. tak, is a secondary to R. wak, which has the meanings of pressing together, and pressing firm (whence also the middle is named; cf.

Arab. samym âlaklab, the solid = the middle point of the heart). תּך, with the plur. תככים, scarcely in itself denotes interest, τόκος; the designation אישׁ תככים includes in it a sensible reproach (Syr. afflictor), and a rentier cannot be so called (Hitzig). Luther: Reiche [rich men], with the marginal note: “who can practise usury as they then generally all do?

” Therefore Löwenstein understands the second line after 1Sa 2:7 : God enlighteneth their eyes by raising the lowly and humbling the proud. But this line, after Pro 22:2, only means that the poor as well as the rich owe the light of life (Psa 13:4) to God, the creator and ruler of all things - a fact which has also its moral side: both are conditioned by Him, stand under His control, and have to give to Him an account; or otherwise rendered: God maketh His sun to rise on the low and the high, the evil and the good (cf.

Mat 5:45) - an all-embracing love full of typical moral motive.

Pro 29:14 14 A king who judgeth the poor with truth, His throne shall stand for ever. בּאמת, as at Isa 16:5 (synon. באמונה, במישׁרים, במישׁור), is equivalent to fidelity to duty, or a complete, full accomplishment of his duty as a ruler with reference to the dispensing of justice; in other words: after the norm of actual fact, and of the law, and of his duty proceeding from both together.

מלך has in Codd. , e. g. , Jaman . , and in the Venetian 1517, 21, rightly Rebia . In that which follows, שׁופט באמת are more closely related than באמת דלים, for of two conjunctives standing together the first always connects more than the second. מלך שׁופט באמת דלים is the truest representation of the logical grammatical relation. To 14b compare the proverb of the king, Pro 16:12; Pro 25:5.

Pro 29:15 A proverb with שׁבט, Pro 29:15, is placed next to one with שׁופט, but it begins a group of proverbs regarding discipline in the house and among the people: 15 The rod and reproof give wisdom; But an undisciplined son is a shame to his mother. With שׁבט [a rod], which Pro 22:15 also commends as salutary, תּוכחת refers to discipline by means of words, which must accompany bodily discipline, and without them is also necessary; the construction of the first line follows in number and gender the scheme Pro 27:9, Zec 7:7; Ewald, §339c.

In the second line the mother is named, whose tender love often degenerates into a fond indulgence; such a darling, such a mother’s son, becomes a disgrace to his mother. Our “ ausgelassen ,” by which Hitzig translates משׁלּח, is used of joyfulness unbridled and without self-restraint, and is in the passage before us too feeble a word; שׁלּח is used of animals pasturing at liberty, wandering in freedom (Job 39:5; Isa 16:2); נער משׁלח is accordingly a child who is kept in by no restraint and no punishment, one left to himself, and thus undisciplined (Luther, Gesenius, Fleischer, and others).

Pro 29:16 16 When the godless increase, wickedness increaseth; But the righteous shall see their fall. The lxx translation is not bad: πολλῶν ὄντων ἀσεβῶν πολλαὶ γίνονται ἁμαρτίαι ( vid . , regarding רבה, Pro 29:2, Pro 28:28); but in the main it is only a Binsenwahrheit , as they say in Swabia, i. e. , a trivial saying. The proverb means, that if among a people the party of the godless increases in number, and at the same time in power, wickedness, i.

e. , a falling away into sins of thought and conduct, and therewith wickedness, prevails. When irreligion and the destruction of morals thus increase, the righteous are troubled; but the conduct of the godless carries the judgment in itself, and the righteous shall with joy perceive, in the righteous retribution of God, that the godless man will be cast down from his power and influence.

This proverb is like a motto to Psa 12:1-8.

Pro 29:17 17 Correct thy son, and he will give thee delight, And afford pleasure to thy soul. The lxx well translates ויניחך by καὶ ἀναπαύσει σε; הניח denotes rest properly, a breathing again, ἀνάψυξις; and then, with an obliteration of the idea of restraint so far, generally (like the Arab. araḥ, compared by Fleischer) to afford pleasure or delight. The post.

-bibl. language uses for this the words נחת רוּח, and says of the pious that he makes נחת רוח to his Creator, Berachoth 17a; and of God, that He grants the same to them that fear Him, Berach . 29b; in the morning prayer of the heavenly spirits, that they hallow their Creator בנחת רוח (with inward delight). Write with Codd. (also Jaman .) and older editions ויניחך, not ויניחךּ; for, except in verbs 'ה'ל, the suffix of this Hiphil form is not dageshed, e.

g. , אמיתך, 1Ki 2:26; cf. also 1Ki 22:16 and Psa 50:8. מעדנּים the lxx understands, after 2Sa 1:24 (עם־עדנים, μετὰ κόσμου), also here, of ornament; but the word signifies dainty dishes - here, high spiritual enjoyment. As in Pro 29:15 and Pro 29:16 a transition was made from the house to the people, so there now follows the proverb of the discipline of children, a proverb of the education of the people:

Pro 29:18 18 Without a revelation a people becomes ungovernable; But he that keepeth the law, happy is he. Regarding the importance of this proverb for estimating the relation of the Chokma to prophecy, vid . , vol. i. p. 41. חזון is, according to the sense, equivalent to נבוּאה, the prophetic revelation in itself, and as the contents of that which is proclaimed.

Without spiritual preaching, proceeding from spiritual experience, a people is unrestrained (יפּרע, vid . , regarding the punctuation at Pro 28:25, and regarding the fundamental meaning, at Pro 1:25); it becomes פּרע, disorderly, Exo 32:25; wild und wüst , as Luther translates. But in the second line, according to the unity of the antithesis, the words are spoken of the people, not of individuals.

It is therefore not to be explained, with Hitzig: but whoever, in such a time, nevertheless holds to the law, it is well with him! Without doubt this proverb was coined at a time when the preaching of the prophets was in vogue; and therefore this, “but whoever, notwithstanding,” is untenable; such a thought at that time could not at all arise; and besides this, תורה is in the Book of Proverbs a moveable conception, which is covered at least by the law in contradistinction to prophecy.

Tôra denotes divine teaching, the word of God; whether that of the Sinaitic or that of the prophetic law (2Ch 15:3, cf. e. g. , Isa 1:10). While, on the one hand, a people is in a dissolute condition when the voice of the preacher, speaking from divine revelation, and enlightening their actions and sufferings by God’s word, is silent amongst them (Psa 74:9, cf.

Amo 8:12); on the other hand, that same people are to be praised as happy when they show due reverence and fidelity to the word of God, both as written and as preached. That the word of God is preached among a people belongs to their condition of life; and they are only truly happy when they earnestly and willingly subordinate themselves to the word of God which they possess and have the opportunity of hearing.

אשׁרהוּ (defective for אשׁריהוּ) is the older, and here the poetic kindred form to אשׁריו, Pro 14:21; Pro 16:20.

Pro 29:19 From the discipline of the people this series of proverbs again returns to the discipline of home: 19 With words a servant will not let himself be bettered; For he understandeth them, but conformeth not thereto. The Niph . נוסר becomes a so-called tolerative, for it connects with the idea of happening that of reaching its object: to become truly bettered (taught in wisdom, corrected), and thus to let himself be bettered.

With mere words this is not reached; the unreasonable servant needs, in order to be set right, a more radical means of deliverance. This assertion demands confirmation; therefore is the view of von Hofmann ( Schriftbew . ii. 2. 404) improbable, that 19b has in view a better-disposed servant: supposing that he is intelligent, in which case he is admonished without cause, then the words are also lost: he will let them pass over him in silence without any reply.

This attempted explanation is occasioned by this, that מענה can signify nothing else than a response in words. If this were correct, then without doubt its fundamental meaning would correspond with כּי; for one explains, with Löwenstein, “for he perceives it, and may not answer,” i. e. , this, that a reply cut off frustrates the moral impression. Or also: for he understands it, but is silent - in praefractum se silentium configit (Schultens); and thus it is with the ancients (Rashi).

But why should not ואין מענה itself be the expression of this want of any consequences? מענה cannot certainly mean humiliation (Meîri, after Exo 10:3, הכנעה), but why as an answer in words and not also a response by act (Stuart: a practical answer)? Thus the lxx ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ νοήσῃ, ἀλλ ̓ οὐχ ὑπακούσεται, according to which Luther: for although he at once understands it, he does not yet take it to himself.

That מענה tahT . may mean obedience, the Aram. so understood, also at Pro 16:4. It denoted a reply in the most comprehensive meaning of the word, vid . , at Pro 16:1. The thought, besides, is the same as if one were to explain: for he understands it, and is silent, i. e. , lets thee speak; or: he understands it, but that which he perceives finds no practical echo.

Pro 29:20 20 Seest thou a man hasty in his words? The fool hath more hope than he. Cf. Pro 26:12. Such an one has blocked up against himself the path to wisdom, which to the fool, i. e. , to the ingenuous, stands open; the former is perfect, of the latter something may yet be made. In this passage the contrast is yet more precise, for the fool is thought of as the dull, which is the proper meaning of כּסיל, vid .

, under Pro 17:24. There is more hope for the fool than for him, although he may be no fool in himself, who overthrows himself by his words. “The προπετὴς ἐν λόγῳ αὐτοῦ (Sir. 9:18) has, in the existing case, already overleaped the thought; the כסיל has it still before him, and comes at length, perhaps with his slow conception, to it” (Hitzig); for the ass, according to the fable, comes at last farther than the greyhound.

Hence, in words as well as in acts, the proverb holds good, “ Eile mit Weile ” [= festina lente ]. Every word, as well as act, can only be matured by being thought out, and thought over. From this proverb, which finds its practical application to the affairs of a house, and particularly also to the relation to domestics, the group returns to the subject of instruction, which is its ground-tone.

Pro 29:21 21 If one pampers his servant from youth up, He will finally reach the place of a child. The lxx had no answer to the question as to the meaning of מנון. On the other hand, for פּנּק, the meaning to fondle; delicatius enutrire , is perfectly warranted by the Aram. and Arab. The Talmud, Succa 52b, resorts to the alphabet בח''אט in order to reach a meaning for מנון.

How the Targ. comes to translate the word by מנסּח (outrooted) is not clear; the rendering of Jerome: postea sentiet eum contumacem , is perhaps mediated by the ἔσται γογγυσμός of Symmachus, who combines נון with לון, Niph . γογγύζειν. The ὀθυνηθήσεται of the lxx, with the Syr. , von Hofmann has sought to justify ( Schriftbew . ii. 2. 404), for he derives מנון = מנהון from נהה.

We must then punctuate מנּון; but perhaps the lxx derived the word from אנן = מאנון, whether they pronounced it מנון (cf. מסרת = מאסרת) or מנּון. To follow them is not wise, for the formation of the word is precarious; one does not see with the speaker of this proverb, to whom the language presented a fulness of synonyms for the idea of complaint, meant by using this peculiar word.

Linguistically these meanings are impossible: of Jerome, dominus = ממנּה (Ahron b. Josef, Meîri, and others); or: the oppressed = מוּנה, from ינה (Johlson); or: one who is sick = מונה (Euchel). and Ewald’s “ undankbar ” [unthankful], derived from the Arabic, is a mere fancy, since (Arab.) manuwan does not mean one who is unthankful, but, on the contrary, one who upbraids good deeds shown.

The ancients are in the right track, who explain מנון after the verb נוּן, Psa 72:17 = נין = בּן; the Venet . , herein following Kimchi, also adopts the nominal form, for it translates (but without perceptible meaning) γόνωσις. Luther’s translation is fortunate: “If a servant is tenderly treated from youth up, He will accordingly become a Junker [squire]. ” The ideas represented in modern Jewish translations: that of a son ( e.

g. , Solomon: he will at last be the son) and that of a master (Zunz), are here united. But how the idea of a son (from the verb נון), at the same time that of a master, may arise, is not to be perceived in the same way as with Junker and the Spanish infante and hidalgo ; rather with מנון, as the ironical naming of the son (little son), the idea of a weakling (de Wette) may be connected.

The state of the matter appears as follows: - the Verb נוּן has the meanings of luxuriant growth, numerous propagation; the fish has from this the Aram. name of נוּן, like the Heb. דּג, from דּגה, which also means luxuriant, exuberant increase ( vid . , at Psa 72:17). From this is derived נין, which designates the offspring as a component part of a kindred, as well as מנון, which, according as the מ is interpreted infin.

or local, means either this, that it sprouts up luxuriantly, the abundant growth, or also the place of luxuriant sprouting, wanton growing, abundant and quick multiplication: thus the place of hatching, spawning. The subject in יהיה might be the fondled one; but it lies nearer, however, to take him who fondles as the subject, as in 21a. אחריתו is either adv.

accus. for באחריתו, or, as we preferred at Pro 23:32, it is the subj. introducing, after the manner of a substantival clause, the following sentence as its virtual predicate: “one has fondled his servant from his youth up, and his (that of the one who fondles) end is: he will become a place of increase. ” The master of the house is thought of along with his house; and the servant as one who, having become a man, presents his master with ילידי בּית, who are spoilt scapegraces, as he himself has become by the pampering of his master.

There was used in the language of the people, נין for בּן, in the sense on which we name a degenerate son a “ Schönes Früchtchen ” [pretty little fruit]; and מנון is a place (house) where many נינים are; and a man (master of a house) who has many of them is one whose family has increased over his head. One reaches the same meaning if מנון is rendered more immediately as the place or state of growing, increasing, luxuriating.

The sense is in any case: he will not be able, in the end, any more to defend himself against the crowd which grows up to him from this his darling, but will be merely a passive part of it.

Pro 29:22 The following group begins with a proverb which rhymes by מדון, with מנון of the foregoing, and extends on to the end of this Hezekiah collection: 22 A man of anger stirreth up strife; And a passionate man aboundeth in transgression. Line first is a variation of Pro 15:18 and Pro 28:25. אישׁ and בּעל as here, but in the reverse order at Pro 22:24. אף here means anger, not the nose, viz.

, the expanded nostrils (Schultens). In רב־פּשׁע the פשׁע is, after Pro 14:29; Pro 28:16; Pro 20:27, the governed genitive; Hitzig construes it in the sense of פשׁע רב, Psa 19:2, with יגרה, but one does not say גּרה פשׁע; and that which is true of רבּים, that, after the manner of a numeral, it can precede its substantive ( vid . , under Ps. 7:26; Psa 89:51), cannot be said of רב.

Much (great) in wickedness denotes one who heaps up many wicked actions, and burdens himself with greater guilt (cf. פשׁע, Pro 29:16). The wrathful man stirreth up ( vid . , under Pro 15:18) strife, for he breaks through the mutual relations of men, which rest on mutual esteem and love, and by means of his passionate conduct he makes enemies of those against whom he thinks that he has reason for being angry; that on account of which he is angry can be settled without producing such hostility, but passion impels him on, and misrepresents the matter; it embitters hearts, and tears them asunder.

The lxx has, instead of רב, ἐξώρυξεν, of dreaming, כרה (Pro 16:27).

Pro 29:23 Pro 29:23 passes from anger to haughtiness: A man’s pride will bring him low; But the lowly attaineth to honour. Thus we translate תּתמך כּבוד (Lat. honorem obtinet ) in accord with Pro 11:16, and שׁפל־רוּח with Pro 16:19, where, however, שׁפל is not adj. as here, but inf. The haughty man obscures the honour which he has by this, that he boasts immeasurably of it, and aspires yet more after it; the lowly man, on the other hand, obtains honour without his seeking it, honour before God and before men, which would be of no worth were it not connected with the honour before God.

The lxx: τοὺς δὲ ταπεινόφρονας ἐπείδει δόξῃ κύριους. This κύριους is indeed not contrary to the sense, but it is opposed to the style. Why the 24th verse should now follow is, as regards the contents and the expression, hard to say; but one observes that Pro 29:22-27 follow each other, beginning with the successive letters of the alphabet א (ב), ג, ח, ח, ר, ת (ת).

Pro 29:24 24 He that taketh part with a thief hateth himself; He heareth the oath and confesseth not. Hitzig renders the first member as the pred. of the second: “he who does not bring to light such sins as require an atonement (Lev 5:1.) , but shares the secret of them with the sinner, is not better than one who is a partner with a thief, who hateth himself.

” The construction of the verse, he remarks, is not understood by any interpreter. It is not, however, so cross, - for, understood as Hitzig thinks it ought to be, the author should have expressed the subject by שׁמע אלה ולא יגיד, - but is simple as the order of the words and the verbal form require it. The oath is, after Lev 5:1, that of the judge who adjures the partner of the thief by God to tell the truth; but he conceals it, and burdens his soul with a crime worthy of death, for from a concealer he becomes in addition a perjured man.

Pro 29:25 25 Fear of man bringeth a snare with it; But he that trusteth in Jahve is advanced. It sounds strange, Hitzig remarks, that here in the Book of an Oriental author one should be warned against the fear of man. It is enough, in reply to this, to point to Isa 51:12. One of the two translations in the lxx (cf. Jerome and Luther) has found this “strange” thought not so strange as not to render it, and that in the gnomic aorist: φοβηθέντες καὶ αἰσχυνθέντες ἀνθρώπους ὑπεσκελίσθησαν.

And why should not חרדּת אדם be able to mean the fear of man (cowardice)? Perhaps not so that אדם is the gen. objecti , but so that חרדת אדם means to frighten men, as in 1Sa 14:15. חרדת אלהים, a trembling of God; cf. Psa 64:2; פחד איב, the fear occasioned by the enemy, although this connection, after Deu 2:25, can also mean fear of the enemy ( gen. objecti ).

To יתּן, occasioned = brings as a consequence with it, cf. Pro 10:10; Pro 13:15; the synallage generis is as at Pro 12:25 : it is at least strange with fem. infinit. and infinitival nouns, Pro 16:16; Pro 25:14; Psa 73:28; but חרדּה (trembling) is such a nom. actionis , Ewald, §238a. Regarding ישׂגּב (for which the lxx. 1 σωθήσεται, and lxx2 εὐφρανθήσεται = ישׂמח), vid .

, at Pro 18:10. He who is put into a terror by a danger with which men threaten him, so as to do from the fear of man what is wrong, and to conceal the truth, falls thereby into a snare laid by himself - it does not help him that by this means he has delivered himself from the danger, for he brands himself as a coward, and sins against God, and falls into an agony of conscience (reproach and anguish of heart) which is yet worse to bear than the evil wherewith he was threatened.

It is only confidence in God that truly saves. The fear of man plunges him into yet greater suffering than that from which he would escape; confidence in God, on the other hand, lifts a man internally, and at last externally, above all his troubles.

Pro 29:26 A similar gen. connection to that between חרדת אדם exists between משׁפט־אישׁ: Many seek the countenance of the ruler; Yet from Jahve cometh the judgment of men. Line first is a variation of Pro 19:6, cf. 1Ki 10:24. It lies near to interpret אישׁ as gen. obj . : the judgment regarding any one, i. e. , the estimating of the man, the decision regarding him; and it is also possible, for משׁפּטי, Psa 17:2, may be understood of the judgment which I have, as well as of the judgment pronounced regarding me (cf.

Lam 3:59). But the usage appears to think of the genit. after משׁפט always as subjective, e. g. , Pro 16:33, of the decision which the lot brings, Job 36:6, the right to which the poor have a claim; so that thus in the passage before us משׁפט־אשׁ means the right of a man, as that which is proper or fitting to him, the judgment of a man, as that to which as appropriate he has a claim (lxx τὸ δίκαιον ἀνδρί).

Whether the genit. be rendered in the one way or the other, the meaning remains the same: it is not the ruler who finally decides the fate and determines the worth of a man, as they appear to think who with eye-service court his favour and fawn upon him.

Pro 29:27 27 An abomination to a righteous man is a villanous man; And an abomination to the godless is he who walketh uprightly. In all the other proverbs which begin with תועבת, e. g. , Pro 11:20, יהוה follows as genit. , here צדּיקים, whose judgment is like that of God. אישׁ עול is an abhorrence to them, not as a man, but just as of such a character; עול is the direct contrast to ישׁר.

The righteous sees in the villanous man, who boldly does that which is opposed to morality and to honour, an adversary of his God; on the other hand, the godless sees in the man that walketh uprightly (ישׁר־דּרך, as at Psa 37:14) his adversary, and the condemnation of himself. With this doubled ת the Book of Proverbs, prepared by the men of Hezekiah, comes to an end.

It closes, in accordance with its intention announced at the beginning, with a proverb concerning the king, and a proverb of the great moral contrasts which are found in all circles of society up to the very throne itself.

Pro 30:1 The title of this first appendix, according to the text lying before us, is: “The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, the utterance. ” This title of the following collection of proverbs is limited by Olewejored ; and המּשּׂא, separated from the author’s name by Rebia , is interpreted as a second inscription, standing on one line with דּברי, as particularizing that first.

The old synagogue tradition which, on the ground of the general title Pro 1:1, regarded the whole Book of Proverbs as the work of Solomon, interpreted the words, “Agur the son of Jakeh,” as an allegorical designation of Solomon, who appropriated the words of the Tôra to the king, Deu 17:17, and again rejected them, for he said: God is with me, and I shall not do it (viz. , take many wives, without thereby suffering injury), Schemôth rabba , c.

6. The translation of Jerome: Verba congregantis filii Vomentis , is the echo of this Jewish interpretation. One would suppose that if “Agur” were Solomon’s name, “Jakeh” must be that of David; but another interpretation in Midrash Mishle renders בן (“son”) as the designation of the bearer of a quality, and sees in “Agur” one who girded (אגר = חגר) his loins for wisdom; and in “son of Jakeh” one free from sin (חטא ועון נקי מכל).

In the Middle Ages this mode of interpretation, which is historically and linguistically absurd, first began to prevail; for then the view was expressed by several (Aben Ezra, and Meîri the Spaniard) that Agur ben Jakeh was a wise man of the time of Solomon. That of Solomon’s time, they thence conclude (blind to Pro 25:1) that Solomon collected together these proverbs of the otherwise unknown wise man.

In truth, the age of the man must remain undecided; and at all events, the time of Hezekiah is the fixed period from which, where possible, it is to be sought. The name “Agur” means the gathered (Pro 6:8; Pro 10:5), or, after the predominant meaning of the Arab. âjar, the bribed, mercede conductum ; also the collector (cf. יקוּשׁ, fowler); or the word might mean, perhaps, industrious in collecting (cf.

'alwaḳ, attached to, and other examples in Mühlau, p. 36). Regarding בּן = binj (usual in בּן־נּוּן), and its relation to the Arab. ibn, vid . , Genesis , p. 555. The name Jakeh is more transparent . The noun יקהה, Pro 30:17; Gen 49:10, means the obedient, from the verb יקהּ; but, formed from this verbal stem, the form of the word would be יקהּ (not יקה). The form יקה is the participial adj.

from יקה, like יפה from יפה; and the Arab. waḳay, corresponding to this יקה, viii. ittaḳay, to be on one’s guard, particularly before God; the usual word fore piety regarded as εὐλάβεια. Mühlau (p. 37) rightly sees in the proper names Eltekeh [Jos 19:44] and Eltekon [Jos 15:59] the secondary verbal stem תּקה, which, like e. g. , תּוה (תּאה), תּאב, עתד, has originated from the reflexive, which in these proper names, supposing that אל is subj.

, means to take under protection; not: to give heed = cavere. All these meanings are closely connected. In all these three forms - יקהּ, יקה, תּקה - the verb is a synonym of שׁמר; so that יקה denotes the pious, either as taking care, εὐλαβής, or as keeping, i. e. , observing, viz. , that which is commanded by God. In consequence of the accentuation, המשּׂא is the second designation of this string of proverbs, and is parallel with דברי.

But that is absolutely impossible. משּׂא (from נשׂא, to raise, viz. , the voice, to begin to express) denotes the utterance, and according to the usage of the words before us, the divine utterance, the message of God revealed to the prophet and announced by him, for the most part, if not always ( vid . , at Isa 13:1), the message of God as the avenger. Accordingly Jewish interpreters ( e.

g. , Meîri and Arama) remark that משׂא designates what follows, as דבר נבוּאיּי, i. e. , an utterance of the prophetic spirit. But, on the other hand, what follows begins with the confession of human weakness and short-sightedness; and, moreover, we read proverbs not of a divine but altogether of a human and even of a decaying spiritual stamp, besides distinguished from the Solomonic proverbs by this, that the I of the poet, which remains in the background, here comes to the front.

This משׂא of prophetic utterances does not at all harmonize with the following string of proverbs. It does not so harmonize on this account, because one theme does not run through these proverbs which the sing. משׂא requires. It comes to this, that משׂא never occurs by itself in the sense of a divine, a solemn utterance, without having some more clearly defining addition, though it should be only a demonstrative הזּה (Isa 14:28).

But what author, whether poet or prophet, would give to his work the title of משׂא, which in itself means everything, and thus nothing! And now: the utterance - what can the article at all mean here? This question has remained unanswered by every interpreter. Ewald also sees himself constrained to clothe the naked word; he does it by reading together המשׂא נאם, and translating the “sublime saying which he spoke.

” But apart from the consideration that Jer 23:31 proves nothing for the use of this use of נאם, the form (הגבר) נאם is supported by 2Sa 23:1 (cf. Pro 30:5 with 2Sa 22:31); and besides, the omission of the אשׁר, and in addition of the relative pronoun (נאמו), would be an inaccuracy not at all to be expected on the brow of this gnomology ( vid . , Hitzig). If we leave the altogether unsuspected נאם undisturbed, המשׂא will be a nearer definition of the name of the author.

The Midrash has a right suspicion, for it takes together Hamassa and Agur ben Jakeh , and explains: of Agur the son of Jakeh, who took upon himself the yoke of the most blessed. The Graecus Venetus comes nearer what is correct, for it translates: λόγοι Ἀγούρου υἱέως Ἰακέως τοῦ Μασάου. We connect Pro 31:1, where למוּאל מלך, “Lemuel (the) king,” is a linguistic impossibility, and thus, according to the accentuation lying before us, מלך משּׂא also are to be connected together; thus it appears that משׂא must be the name of a country and a people.

It was Hitzig who first made this Columbus-egg to stand. But this is the case only so far as he recognised in למואל מלך משׂא a Lemuel, the king of Massa, and recognised this Massa also in Pro 30:1 ( vid . , his dissertation: Das Königreich Massa [the kingdom of Massa], in Zeller’s Theolog. Jahrbb . 1844, and his Comm .) , viz. , the Israelitish Massa named in Gen 25:14 (= 1Ch 1:30) along with Dumah and Tema .

But he proceeds in a hair-splitting way, and with ingenious hypothesis, without any valid foundation. That this Dumah is the Dumat el-jendel (cf. under Isa 21:11) lying in the north of Nejed, near the southern frontiers of Syria, the name and the founding of which is referred by the Arabians to Dûm the son of Ishmael, must be regarded as possible, and consequently Massa is certainly to be sought in Northern Arabia.

But if, on the ground of 1Ch 4:42. , he finds there a Simeonitic kingdom, and finds its origin in this, that the tribe of Simeon originally belonging to the ten tribes, and thus coming from the north settled in the south of Judah, and from thence in the days of Hezekiah, fleeing before the Assyrians, were driven farther and farther in a south-east direction towards Northern Arabia; on the contrary, it has been shown by Graf ( The Tribe of Simeon , a contribution to the history of Israel, 1866) that Simeon never settled in the north of the Holy Land, and according to existing evidences extended their settlement from Negeb partly into the Idumean highlands, but not into the highlands of North Arabia.

Hitzig thinks that there are found traces of the Massa of Agur and Lemuel in the Jewish town of טילמאס, of Benjamin of Tudela, lying three days’ journey from Chebar, and in the proper name (Arab.) Malsā (smooth), which is given to a rock between Tema and Wady el-Kora ( vid . , Kosegarten’s Chestom . p. 143); but how notched his ingenuity here is need scarcely be shown.

By means of more cautious combinations Mühlau has placed the residence of Agur and Lemuel in the Hauran mountain range, near which there is a Dumah , likewise a Têmâ ; and in the name of the town Mismîje , lying in the Lejâ, is probably found the Mishma which is named along with Massa , Gen 25:14; and from this that is related in 1Ch 5:9. , 1Ch 5:18-22, of warlike expeditions on the part of the tribes lying on the east of the Jordan against the Hagarenes and their allies Jetur , Nephish , and Nodab , it is with certainty concluded that in the Hauran, and in the wilderness which stretches behind the Euphrates towards it, Israelitish tribes have had their abode, whose territory had been early seized by the trans-Jordanic tribes, and was held “until the captivity,” 1Ch 5:22, i.

e. , till the Assyrian deportation. This designation of time is almost as unfavourable to Mühlau’s theory of a Massa in the Hauran, inhabited by Israelitish tribes from the other side, as the expression “ to Mount Seir ” (1Ch 4:42) is to Hitzig’s North Arabian Massa inhabited by Simeonites. We must leave it undecided whether Dumah and Têmâ , which the Toledoth of Ismael name in the neighbourhood of Massa , are the east Hauran districts now existing; or as Blau ( Deut.

Morgl. Zeit . xxv. 539), with Hitzig, supposes, North Arabian districts (cf. Genesis . p. 377, 4th ed.) “Be it as it may, the contents and the language of this difficult piece almost necessarily point to a region bordering on the Syro-Arabian waste. Ziegler’s view ( Neue Uebers. der Denksprüche Salomo's , 1791, p. 29), that Lemuel was probably an emir of an Arabian tribe in the east of Jordan, and that a wise Hebrew translated those proverbs of the emir into Hebrew, is certainly untenable, but does not depart so far from the end as may appear at the first glance” (Mühlau).

If the text-punctuation lying before us rests on the false supposition that Massa , Pro 30:1; Pro 31:1, is a generic name, and not a proper name, then certainly the question arises whether משׂא should not be used instead of משּׂא, much more משׂא, which is suggested as possible in the article “Sprüche,” in Herzog’s Encycl . xiv. 694. Were משׁא, Gen 10:30, the region Μεσήνη, on the northern border of the Persian Gulf, in which Apamea lay, then it might be said in favour of this, that as the histories of Muhammed and of Benjamin of Tudela prove the existence of an old Jewish occupation of North Arabia, but without anything being heard of a משּׂא, the Talmud bears testimony to a Jewish occupation of Mesene, and particularly of Apamea; and by the mother of Lemuel, the king of Mesha , one may think of Helena, celebrated in Jewish writings, queen of Adiabene, the mother of Monabaz and Izates.

But the identity of the Mesha of the catalogue of nations with Μεσήνη is uncertain, and the Jewish population of that place dates at least from the time of the Sassanides to the period of the Babylonian exile. We therefore hold by the Ishmaelite Massa , whether North Arabian or Hauranian; but we by no means subscribe Mühlau’s non possumus non negare, Agurum et Lemuëlem proseytos e paganis, non Israelitas fuisse .

The religion of the tribes descended from Abraham, so far as it had not degenerated, was not to be regarded as idolatrous. It was the religion which exists to the present day among the great Ishmaelite tribes of the Syrian desert as the true tradition of their fathers under the name of Dîn Ibrâhîm (Abraham’s religion); which, as from Wetzstein, we have noted in the Commentary on Job (p.

387 and elsewhere), continues along with Mosaism among the nomadic tribes of the wilderness; which shortly before the appearance of Christianity in the country beyond the Jordan, produced doctrines coming into contact with the teachings of the gospel; which at that very time, according to historic evidences ( e. g. , Mêjâsinî’s chronicles of the Ka'be ), was dominant even in the towns of Higâz; and in the second century after Christ, was for the first time during the repeated migration of the South Arabians again oppressed by Greek idolatry, and was confined to the wilderness; which gave the mightiest impulse to the rise of Islam, and furnished its best component part; and which towards the end of the last century, in the country of Neged, pressed to a reform of Islam, and had as a result the Wahabite doctrine.

If we except Pro 30:5. , the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel contain nothing which may not be conceived from a non-Israelitish standpoint on which the author of the Book of Job placed himself. Even Job 30:5. is not there (cf. Job 6:10; Job 23:12) without parallels. When one compares Deu 4:2; Deu 13:1, and 2Sa 22:31 = Psa 18:31 (from which Pro 30:5 of the proverbs of Agur is derived, with the change of יהוה into אלוהּ), Agur certainly appears as one intimately acquainted with the revealed religion of Israel, and with their literature.

But must we take the two Massites therefore, with Hitzig, Mühlau, and Zöckler, as born Israelites? Since the Bible history knows no Israelitish king outside of the Holy Land, we regard it as more probable that King Lemuel and his countryman Agur were Ishmaelites who had raised themselves above the religion of Abraham, and recognised the religion of Israel as its completion.

If we now return to the words of Pro 30:1, Hitzig makes Agur Lemuel’s brother, for he vocalizes אגוּר בּן־יקההּ משּׂא, i. e. , Agur the son of her whom Massa obeys. Ripa and Björck of Sweden, and Stuart of America, adopt this view. But supposing that יקהּ is connected with the accusative of him who is obeyed, בן, as the representative of such an attributive clause, as of its virtual genitive, is elsewhere without example; and besides, it is unadvisable to explain away the proper name יקה, which speaks for itself.

There are two other possibilities of comprehending המּשּׁא, without the change, or with the change of a single letter. Wetzstein, on Pro 31:1, has said regarding Mühlau’s translation “King of Massa:” “I would more cautiously translate, 'King of the Massans,' since this interpretation is unobjectionable; while, on the contrary, this is not terra Massa , nor urbs Massa .

It is true that the inhabitants of Massa were not pure nomads, after 30 and 31, but probably, like the other tribes of Israel, they were half nomads, who possessed no great land as exclusive property, and whose chief place did not perhaps bear their name. The latter may then have been as rare in ancient times as it is in the present day. Neither the Sammar , the Harb , the Muntefik , nor other half nomads whom I know in the southern parts of the Syrian desert, have any place which bears their name.

So also, it appears, the people of Uz (עוץ), which we were constrained to think of as a dominant, firmly-settled race, since it had so great a husbandman as Job, possessed no קרית עוּץ. Only in certain cases, where a tribe resided for many centuries in and around a place, does the name of this tribe appear to have remained attached to it. Thus from גוּף דּוּמה, 'the low-country of the Dumahns,' or קרית דּוּמה, 'the city of Dumahns,' as also from קרית תּימא, 'the city of the Temans,' gradually there arose (probably not till the decline and fall of this tribe) a city of Dumah , a haven of Midian , and the like, so that the primary meaning of the name came to be lost.

” It is clear that, from the existence of an Ishmaelite tribe משּׂא, there does not necessarily follow a similar name given to a region. The conj. ממּשּׂא, for המשּׂא ( vid . , Herzog’s Encycl . xiv. 702), has this against it, that although it is good Heb. , it directly leads to this conclusion ( e. g. , 2Sa 23:20, 2Sa 23:29, cf. 1Ki 17:1). Less objectionable is Bunsen’s and Böttcher’s המּשּׂאי.

But perhaps המשׂא may also have the same signification; far rather at least this than that which Malbim, after השּׂר המשּׂא, 1Ch 15:27, introduced with the lxx ἄρχων τῶν ᾠδῶν: “We ought then to compare 2Sa 23:24, דודו בּית לחם, a connection in which, after the analogy of such Arabic connections as ḳaysu'aylana, Kais of the tribe of 'Ailân ( Ibn Coteiba , 13 and 83), or Ma'nu Ṭayyin, Ma'n of the tribe of Tay, i. e.

, Ma'n belonging to this tribe, as distinguished from other men and families of this name (Schol. Hamasae 144. 3), בית לחם is thought of as genit” (Mühlau). That בית לחם (instead of בּית הלּחמי) is easily changed, with Thenius and Wellhausen, after 1Ch 11:26, into מבּית לחם, and in itself it is not altogether homogeneous, because without the article. Yet it may be supposed that instead of משׂא, on account of the appelat.

of the proper name (the lifting up, elatio ), the word המשׂא might be also employed. And since בן־יקה, along with אגור, forms, as it were, one compositum , and does not at all destroy the regulating force of אגור, the expression is certainly, after the Arabic usus loq . , to be thus explained: The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, of the tribe (the country) of Massa.

The second line of this verse, as it is punctuated, is to be rendered: The saying of the man to Ithîel, to Ithîel and Uchal, not Ukkal ; for, since Athias and van der Hooght, the incorrect form ואכּל has become current. J. H. Michaelis has the right form of the word ואכל. Thus, with כ raphatum , it is to be read after the Masora, for it adds to this word the remark לית וחסר, and counts it among the forty-eight words sometimes written defectively without ו ( vid .

, this list in the Masora finalis , 27b, Col); and since it only remarks the absence of the letter lengthening the word where no dagesh follows the vocal, it thus supposes that the כ has no dagesh , as it is also found in Codd. (also Jaman .) written with the Raphe . לאיתיאל is doubly accentuated; the Tarcha represents the Metheg , after the rule Thorath Emeth , p.

11. The ל after נאם is, in the sense of the punctuation, the same dat. as in לאדני, Psa 110:1, and has an apparent right in him who asks כּי תדע in the 4th verse. Ithîel and Uchal must be, after an old opinion, sons, or disciples, or contemporaries, of Agur. Thus, e. g. , Gesenius, in his Lex . under איתיאל, where as yet his reference to Neh 11:7 is wanting.

איתיאל is rendered by Jefet and other Karaites, “there is a God” = איתי אל; but it is perhaps equivalent to אתּי אל, “God is with me;” as for אתּי rof sa ”;e, the form איתי is also found. אכל (אכל) nowhere occurs as a proper name; but in the region of proper names, everything, or almost everything, is possible. Ewald sees in 1b-14 a dialogue: in Pro 30:2-4 the הגּבר, i.

e. , as the word appears to him, the rich, haughty mocker, who has worn out his life, speaks; and in Pro 30:5-14 the “ Mitmirgott ” [= God with me], or, more fully, “ Mitmirgott-sobinichstark ” [= God with me, so am I strong], i. e. , the pious, humble man answers. “The whole,” he remarks, “is nothing but poetical; and it is poetical also that this discourse of mockery is called an elevated strain.

” But (1) גּבר is a harmless word; and in נאם הגּבר, Num 24:3, Num 24:15; 2Sa 23:1, it is a solemn, earnest one; (2) a proper name, consisting of two clauses connected by Vav , no matter whether it be an actual or a symbolical name, is not capable of being authenticated; Ewald, §274b, recognises in 'גּדּלתּי וגו, 1Ch 25:4, the naming, not of one son of Heman, but of two; and (3) it would be a very forced, inferior poetry if the poet placed one half of the name in one line, and then, as if constrained to take a new breath, gave the other half of it in a second line. But, on the other hand, that איתיאל and אכל are the names of two different persons, to whom the address of the man is directed, is attested by the, in this case aimless, anadiplosis , the here unpoetical parallelism with reservation.

The repetition, as Fleischer remarks, of the name Ithîel, which may rank with Uchal, as the son or disciple of Agur, has probably its reason only as this, that one placed a second more extended phrase simply along with the shorter. The case is different; but Fleischer’s supposition, that the poet himself cannot have thus written, is correct. We must not strike out either of the two לאיתיאל; but the supposed proper names must be changed as to their vocalization into a declaratory clause.

A principal argument lies in Pro 30:2, beginning with כּי: this כי supposes a clause which it established; for, with right, Mühlau maintains that כי, in the affirmative sense, which, by means of aposiopesis , proceeds from the confirmative, may open the conclusion and enter as confirmatory into the middle of the discourse ( e. g. , Isa 32:13), but cannot stand abruptly at the commencement of a discourse (cf.

under Isa 15:1 and Isa 7:9). But if we now ask how it is to be vocalized, there comes at the same time into the sphere of investigation the striking phrase נאם הגּבר. This phrase all the Greek interpreters attest by their rendering, τάδε λέγει ὁ ἀνήρ ( Venet . φησὶν ἀνήρ); besides, this is to be brought forward from the wilderness of the old attempts at a translation, that the feeling of the translators strives against the recognition in ואכל of a second personal name: the Peshito omits it; the Targ.

translates it, after the Midrash, by ואוּכל (I may do it); as Theodotion, καὶ δυνήσομαι, which is probably also meant by the καὶ συνήσομαι (from συνείναι, to be acquainted with) of the Venet . ; the lxx with καὶ παύομαι; and Aquila, καὶ τέλεσον (both from the verb כלה). As an objection to נאם הגבר is this, that it is so bald without being followed, as at Num 24:3, Num 24:15; 2Sa 23:1, with the attributive description of the man.

Luther was determined thereby to translate: discourse of the man Leithiel.... And why could not לאיתיאל be a proper-name connection like שׁאלתּיאל (שׁלתּיאל)? Interpreted in the sense of “I am troubled concerning God,” is might be a symbolical name of the φιλόσοφος, as of one who strives after the knowledge of divine things with all his strength. But (1) לאה, with the accus.

obj. , is not established, and one is rather inclined to think of a name such as כּליתיאל, after Psa 84:3; (2) moreover, לאיתיאל cannot be at one time a personal name, and at another time a declarative sentence - one must both times transform it into לאיתי אל; but אל has to be taken as a vocative, not as accus. , as is done by J. D. Michaelis, Hitzig, Bunsen, Zöckler, and others, thus: I have wearied myself, O God!...

The nakedness of הגבר is accordingly not covered by the first Leithiel . Mühlau, in his work, seeks to introduce המשׂא changed into ממשׂא: “The man from Massa,” and prefers to interpret הגבר generically: “proverb (confession) of the man ( i. e. , the man must confess): I have wearied myself, O God!... ” Nothing else in reality remains. The article may also be retrospective: the man just now named, whose “words” are announced, viz.

, Agur. But why was not the expression נאם אגור then used? Because it is not poetical to say: “the (previously named) man. ” On the other hand, what follows applies so that one may understand, under הגבר, any man you choose. There are certainly among men more than too many who inquire not after God (Psa 14:2.) But there are also not wanting those who feel sorrowfully the distance between them and God.

Agur introduces such a man as speaking, for he generalizes his own experience. Psa 36:2 ( vid . , under this passage) shows that a proper name does not necessarily follow נאם. With נאם הגבר Agur then introduces what the man has to confess - viz. a man earnestly devoted to God; for with נאם the ideas of that which comes from the heart and the solemnly earnest are connected.

If Agur so far generalizes his own experience, the passionate anadiplosis does not disturb this. After long contemplation of the man, he must finally confess: I have troubled myself, O God! I have troubled myself, O God!... That the trouble was directed toward God is perhaps denoted by the alliteration of לאיתי with אל. But what now, further? ואכל is read as ואכל, ואכל, ואכל, ואכל, ואכל, and it has also been read as ואכל.

The reading ואכל no one advocates; this that follows says the direct contrary, et potui ( pollui ). Geiger ( Urschrift , p. 61) supports the reading ואכל, for he renders it interrogatively: “I wearied myself in vain about God, I wearied myself in vain about God; why should I be able to do it? ” But since one may twist any affirmative clause in this way, and from a yes make a no, one should only, in cases of extreme necessity, consent to such a question in the absence of an interrogative word.

Böttcher’s לאיתי אל, I have wearied myself out in vain, is not Hebrew. But at any rate the expression might be אל־אכל, if only the Vav did not stand between the words! If one might transpose the letters, then we might gain ולא אכל, according to which the lxx translates: οὐ δυνήσομαι. At all events, this despairing as to the consequence of further trouble, “I shall be able to do nothing (shall bring it to nothing),” would be better than ואכל (and I shall withdraw - become faint), for which, besides, ואכלה should be used (cf.

Pro 22:8 with Job 33:21). One expects, after לאיתי, the expression of that which is the consequence of earnest and long-continued endeavour. Accordingly Hitzig reads ואכל, and I have become dull - suitable to the sense, but unsatisfactory on this account, because כּלל, in the sense of the Arab. kall, hebescere , is foreign to the Heb. usus loq . Thus ואכל will be a fut.

consec . of כלה. J. D. Michaelis, and finally Böttcher, read it as fut. consec . Piel ואכל or ואכל ( vid . , regarding this form in pause under Pro 25:9), “and I have made an end;” but it is not appropriate to the inquirer here complaining, when dissatisfaction with his results had determined him to abandon his research, and let himself be no more troubled. We therefore prefer to read with Dahler, and, finally, with Mühlau and Zöckler, ואכל, and I have withdrawn.

The form understood by Hitzig as a pausal form is, in the unchangeableness of its vocals, as accordant with rule as those of יחד, Pro 27:17, which lengthen the a of their first syllables in pause. And if Hitzig objects that too much is said, for one of such meditation does not depart, we answer, that if the inquiry of the man who speaks here has completed itself by the longing of his spirit and his soul (Psa 84:3; Psa 143:7), he might also say of himself, in person, כליתי or ואכל.

An inquiry proceeding not merely from intellectual, but, before all, from practical necessity, is meant - the doubled לאיתי means that he applied thereto the whole strength of his inner and his outer man; and ואכל, that he nevertheless did not reach his end, but wearied himself in vain. By this explanation which we give to 1a, no change of its accents is required; but 1b has to be written: נאם הגּבר לאיתי אל לאיתי אל ואכל

Pro 30:2-3 The כי now following confirms the fruitlessness of the long zealous search: 2 For I am without reason for a man, And a man’s understanding I have not. 3 And I have not learned wisdom, That I may possess the knowledge of the All-Holy. He who cannot come to any fixed state of consecration, inasmuch as he is always driven more and more back from the goal he aims at, thereby brings guilt upon himself as a sinner so great, that every other man stands above him, and he is deep under them all.

So here Agur finds the reason why in divine things he has failed to attain unto satisfying intelligence, not in the ignorance and inability common to all men - he appears to himself as not a man at all, but as an irrational beast, and he misses in himself the understanding which a man properly might have and ought to have. The מן of מאישׁ is not the partitive, like Isa 44:11, not the usual comparative: than any one (Böttcher), which ought to be expressed by מכּל־אישׁ, but it is the negative, as Isa 52:14; Fleischer: rudior ego sum quam ut homo appeller , or: brutus ego, hominis non similis .

Regarding בּער, vid . , under Pro 12:1. Pro 30:3 now says that he went into no school of wisdom, and for that reason in his wrestling after knowledge could attain to nothing, because the necessary conditions to this were wanting to him. But then the question arises: Why this complaint? He must first go to school in order to obtain, according to the word “To him who hath is given,” that for which he strove.

Thus למדתּי refers to learning in the midst of wrestling; but למד, spiritually understood, signifies the acquiring of a kennens [knowledge] or könnens [knowledge = ability]: he has not brought it out from the deep point of his condition of knowledge to make wisdom his own, so that he cannot adjudge to himself knowledge of the all-holy God (for this knowledge is the kernel and the star of true wisdom). If we read 3b לא אדע, this would be synchronistic, nesciebam , with למדתי standing on the same line.

On the contrary, the positive אדע subordinates itself to ולא־למדתי, as the Arab. fâa' lama, in the sense of ( ita ) ut scirem scientiam Sanctissimi , thus of a conclusion, like Lam 1:19, a clause expressive of the intention, Ewald, §347a. קדשׁים is, as at Pro 9:10, the name of God in a superlative sense, like the Arab. el-kuddûs.

Pro 30:2-3 The כי now following confirms the fruitlessness of the long zealous search: 2 For I am without reason for a man, And a man’s understanding I have not. 3 And I have not learned wisdom, That I may possess the knowledge of the All-Holy. He who cannot come to any fixed state of consecration, inasmuch as he is always driven more and more back from the goal he aims at, thereby brings guilt upon himself as a sinner so great, that every other man stands above him, and he is deep under them all.

So here Agur finds the reason why in divine things he has failed to attain unto satisfying intelligence, not in the ignorance and inability common to all men - he appears to himself as not a man at all, but as an irrational beast, and he misses in himself the understanding which a man properly might have and ought to have. The מן of מאישׁ is not the partitive, like Isa 44:11, not the usual comparative: than any one (Böttcher), which ought to be expressed by מכּל־אישׁ, but it is the negative, as Isa 52:14; Fleischer: rudior ego sum quam ut homo appeller , or: brutus ego, hominis non similis .

Regarding בּער, vid . , under Pro 12:1. Pro 30:3 now says that he went into no school of wisdom, and for that reason in his wrestling after knowledge could attain to nothing, because the necessary conditions to this were wanting to him. But then the question arises: Why this complaint? He must first go to school in order to obtain, according to the word “To him who hath is given,” that for which he strove.

Thus למדתּי refers to learning in the midst of wrestling; but למד, spiritually understood, signifies the acquiring of a kennens [knowledge] or könnens [knowledge = ability]: he has not brought it out from the deep point of his condition of knowledge to make wisdom his own, so that he cannot adjudge to himself knowledge of the all-holy God (for this knowledge is the kernel and the star of true wisdom). If we read 3b לא אדע, this would be synchronistic, nesciebam , with למדתי standing on the same line.

On the contrary, the positive אדע subordinates itself to ולא־למדתי, as the Arab. fâa' lama, in the sense of ( ita ) ut scirem scientiam Sanctissimi , thus of a conclusion, like Lam 1:19, a clause expressive of the intention, Ewald, §347a. קדשׁים is, as at Pro 9:10, the name of God in a superlative sense, like the Arab. el-kuddûs.

Pro 30:4 4 Who hath ascended to the heavens and descended? Who hath grasped the wind in his fists? Who hath bound up the waters in a garment? Who hath set right all the ends of the earth? What is his name, and what his son’s name, if thou knowest? The first question here, 'מי וגו, is limited by Pazer ; עלה־שׁמים has Metheg in the third syllable before the tone.

The second question is at least shut off by Pazer , but, contrary to the rule, that Pazer does not repeat itself in a verse; Cod. Erfurt. 2, and several older editions, have for בחפניו more correctly בחפניו with Rebia . So much for the interpunction. חפנים are properly not the two fists, for the fist - that is, the hand gathered into a ball, pugnus - is called אגרף; while, on the contrary, חפן (in all the three dialects) denotes the palm of the hand, vola ( vid .

, Lev 16:12); yet here the hands are represented after they have seized the thing as shut, and thus certainly as fists. The dual points to the dualism of the streams of air produced by the disturbance of the equilibrium; he who rules this movement has, as it were, the north or east wind in one first, and the south or west wind in the other, to let it forth according to his pleasure from this prison (Isa 24:22).

The third question is explained by Job 26:8; the שׂמלה (from שׂמל, comprehendere ) is a figure of the clouds which contain the upper waters, as Job 38:37, the bottles of heaven. “All the ends of the earth” are as at five other places, e. g. , Psa 22:28, the most distant, most remote parts of the earth; the setting up of all these most remote boundaries ( margines ) of the earth is equivalent to the making fast and forming the limits to which the earth extends (Psa 74:17), the determining of the compass of the earth and the form of its figures.

כּי תדע is in symphony with Job 38:5, cf. Job 38:18. The question is here formed as it is there, when Jahve brings home to the consciousness of Job human weakness and ignorance. But there are here two possible significations of the fourfold question. Either it aims at the answer: No man, but a Being highly exalted above all creatures, so that the question מה־שּׁמו [what his name?]

refers to the name of this Being. Or the question is primarily meant of men: What man has the ability? - if there is one, then name him! In both cases מי עלה is not meant, after Pro 24:28, in the modal sense, quis ascenderit , but as the following ויּרד requires, in the nearest indicative sense, quis ascendit . But the choice between these two possible interpretations is very difficult.

The first question is historical: Who has gone to heaven and (as a consequence, then) come down from it again? It lies nearest thus to interpret it according to the consecutio temporum . By this interpretation, and this representation of the going up before the descending again, the interrogator does not appear to think of God, but in contrast to himself, to whom the divine is transcendent, of some other man of whom the contrary is true.

Is there at all, he asks, a man who can comprehend and penetrate by his power and his knowledge the heavens and the earth, the air and the water, i. e. , the nature and the inner condition of the visible and invisible world, the quantity and extent of the elements, and the like? Name to me this man, if thou knowest one, by his name, and designate him to me exactly by his family - I would turn to him to learn from him what I have hitherto striven in vain to find.

But there is not such an one. Thus: as I fell myself limited in my knowledge, so there is not at all any man who can claim limitless können and kennen ability and knowledge. Thus casually Aben Ezra explains, and also Rashi, Arama, and others, but without holding fast to this in its purity; for in the interpretation of the question, “Who hath ascended? ” the reference to Moses is mixed up with it, after the Midrash and Sohar (Parasha, ויקהל, to Exo 35:1), to pass by other obscurities and difficulties introduced.

Among the moderns, this explanation, according to which all aims at the answer, “there is no man to whom this appertains,” has no exponent worth naming. And, indeed, as favourable as is the quis ascendit in coelos ac rursus descendit , so unfavourable is the quis constituit omnes terminos terrae , for this question appears not as implying that it asks after the man who has accomplished this; but the thought, according to all appearance, underlies it, that such an one must be a being without an equal, after whose name inquiry is made.

One will then have to judge עלה and וירד after Gen 28:12; the ascending and descending are compared to our German “ auf und neider ” up and down, for which we do not use the phrase “ nieder und auf ,” and is the expression of free, expanded, unrestrained presence in both regions; perhaps, since וירד is historical, as Psa 18:10, the speaker has the traditional origin of the creation in mind, according to which the earth arose into being earlier than the starry heavens above. Thus the four questions refer (as e.

g. , also Isa 40:12) to Him who has done and who does all that, to Him who is not Himself to be comprehended as His works are, and as He shows Himself in the greatness and wonderfulness of these, must be exalted above them all, and mysterious. If the inhabitant of the earth looks up to the blue heavens streaming in the golden sunlight, or sown with the stars of night; if he considers the interchange of the seasons, and feels the sudden rising of the wind; if he sees the upper waters clothed in fleecy clouds, and yet held fast within them floating over him; if he lets his eye sweep the horizon all around him to the ends of the earth, built up upon nothing in the open world-space (Job 26:7): the conclusion comes to him that he has before him in the whole the work of an everywhere present Being, of an all-wise omnipotent Worker - it is the Being whom he has just named as אל, the absolute Power, and as the קדשׁים, exalted above all created beings, with their troubles and limitations; but this knowledge gained viâ causalitatis , viâ eminentiae , and viâ negationis , does not satisfy yet his spirit, and does not bring him so near to this Being as is to him a personal necessity, so that if he can in some measure answer the fourfold מי, yet there always presses upon him the question מה־שׁמו, what is his name, i.

e. , the name which dissolves the secret of this Being above all beings, and unfolds the mystery of the wonder above all wonders. That this Being must be a person the fourfold מי presupposes; but the question, “What is his name? ” expresses the longing to know the name of this supernatural personality, not any kind of name which is given to him by men, but the name which covers him, which is the appropriate personal immediate expression of his being.

The further question, “And what the name of his son? ” denotes, according to Hitzig, that the inquirer strives after an adequate knowledge, such as one may have of a human being. But he would not have ventured this question if he did not suppose that God was not a monas unity who was without manifoldness in Himself. The lxx translates: ἣ τί ὄνομα τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτοῦ (בּנו), perhaps not without the influence of the old synagogue reference testified to in the Midrash and Sohar of בנו to Israel, God’s first-born; but this interpretation is opposed to the spirit of this חידה (intricate speech, enigma).

Also in general the interrogator cannot seek to know what man stands in this relation of a son to the Creator of all things, for that would be an ethical question which does not accord with this metaphysical one. Geier has combined this ומה־שׁם־בנו with viii. ; and that the interrogator, if he meant the חכמה, ought to have used the phrase ומה־שׁם־בּתּו, says nothing against this, for also in אמון, Pro 8:30, whether it means foster-child or artifex , workmaster, the feminine determination disappears.

Not Ewald alone finds here the idea of the Logos, as the first-born Son of God, revealing itself, on which at a later time the Palestinian doctrine of מימרא דיהוה imprinted itself in Alexandria; but also J. D. Michaelis felt himself constrained to recognise here the N. T. doctrine of the Son of God announcing itself from afar. And why might not this be possible?

The Rig-Veda contains two similar questions, x. 81, 4: “Which was the primeval forest, or what the tree from which one framed the heavens and the earth? Surely, ye wise men, ye ought in your souls to make inquiry whereon he stood when he raised the wind! ” And i. 164, 4: “Who has seen the first-born? Where was the life, the blood, the soul of the world? Who came thither to ask this from any one who knew it?

” Jewish interpreters also interpret בנו of the causa media of the creation of the world. Arama, in his work עקדת יצחק, sect . xvi. , suggests that by בנו we are to understand the primordial element, as the Sankhya-philosophy understands by the first-born there in the Rig, the Prakṛiti, i. e. , the primeval material. R. Levi b. Gerson (Ralbag) comes nearer to the truth when he explains בנו as meaning the cause caused by the supreme cause, in other words: the principium principaiatum of the creation of the world.

We say: the inquirer meant the demiurgic might which went forth from God, and which waited on the Son of God as a servant in the creation of the world; the same might which in chap. 8 is called Wisdom, and is described as God’s beloved Son. But with the name after which inquiry is made, the relation is as with the “more excellent name than the angels,” Heb 1:4.

It is manifestly not the name בן, since the inquiry is made after the name of the בן; but the same is the case also with the name חכמה, or, since this does not harmonize, according to its grammatical gender, with the form of the question, the name דבר (מימר); but it is the name which belongs to the first and only-begotten Son of God, not merely according to creative analogies, but according to His true being. The inquirer would know God, the creator of the world, and His Son, the mediator in the creation of the world, according to their natures.

If thou knowest, says he, turning himself to man, his equal, what the essential names of both are, tell them to me! But who can name them! The nature of the Godhead is hidden, as from the inquirer, so from every one else. On this side of eternity it is beyond the reach of human knowledge. The solemn confession introduced by נאם is now closed. Ewald sees herein the discourse of a sceptical mocker at religion; and Elster, the discourse of a meditating doubter; in Pro 30:5, and on, the answer ought then to follow, which is given to one thus speaking: his withdrawal from the standpoint of faith in the revelation of God, and the challenge to subordinate his own speculative thinking to the authority of the word of God.

But this interpretation of the statement depends on the symbolical rendering of the supposed personal names איתיאל and אכל, and, besides, the dialogue is indicated by nothing; the beginning of the answer ought to have been marked, like the beginning of that to which it is a reply. The confession, 1b-4, is not that of a man who does not find himself in the right condition, but such as one who is thirsting after God must renounce: the thought of a man does not penetrate to the essence of God (Job 11:7-9); even the ways of God remain inscrutable to man (Sir.

18:3; Rom 11:33); the Godhead remains, for our thought, in immeasurable height and depth; and though a relative knowledge of God is possible, yet the dogmatic thesis, Deum quidem cognoscimus, sed non comprehendimus , i. e. , non perfecte cognoscimus quia est infinitus , even over against the positive revelation, remains unchanged. Thus nothing is wanting to make Pro 30:1-4 a complete whole; and what follows does not belong to that section as an organic part of it.