Perfect Sacrifices, Supreme Courts, and the King Who Reads Torah: The Covenant's Institutional Order

Deu 17:2-7 If such a case should occur, as that a man or woman transgressed the covenant of the Lord and went after other gods and worshipped them; when it was made known, the facts were to be carefully inquired into; and if the charge were substantiated, the criminal was to be led out to the gate and stoned. On the testimony of two or three witnesses, not of one only, he was to be put to death (see at Num 35:30); and the hand of the witnesses was to be against him first to put him to death, i.

e. , to throw the first stones at him, and all the people were to follow. With regard to the different kinds of idolatry in Deu 17:3, see Deu 4:19. (On Deu 17:4, see Deu 13:15.) “ Bring him out to thy gates ,” i. e. , to one of the gates of the town in which the crime was committed. By the gates we are to understand the open space near the gates, where the judicial proceedings took place (cf.

Neh 8:1, Neh 8:3; Job. Deu 29:7), the sentence itself being executed outside the town (cf. Deu 22:24; Act 7:58; Heb 13:12), just as it had been outside the camp during the journey through the wilderness (Lev 24:14; Num 15:36), to indicate the exclusion of the criminal from the congregation, and from fellowship with God. The infliction of punishment in Deu 17:5.

is like that prescribed in Deu 13:10-11, for those who tempted others to idolatry; with this exception, that the testimony of more than one witness was required before the sentence could be executed, and the witnesses were to be the first to lift up their hands against the criminal to stone him, that they might thereby give a practical proof of the truth of their statement, and their own firm conviction that the condemned was deserving of death, - “a rule which would naturally lead to the supposition that no man would come forward as a witness without the fullest certainty or the greatest depravity” (Schnell, das isr. Recht).

המּת (Deu 17:6), the man exposed to death, who was therefore really ipso facto already dead. “ So shalt thou put the evil away ,” etc. : cf. Deu 13:6.

Deu 17:2-7 If such a case should occur, as that a man or woman transgressed the covenant of the Lord and went after other gods and worshipped them; when it was made known, the facts were to be carefully inquired into; and if the charge were substantiated, the criminal was to be led out to the gate and stoned. On the testimony of two or three witnesses, not of one only, he was to be put to death (see at Num 35:30); and the hand of the witnesses was to be against him first to put him to death, i.

e. , to throw the first stones at him, and all the people were to follow. With regard to the different kinds of idolatry in Deu 17:3, see Deu 4:19. (On Deu 17:4, see Deu 13:15.) “ Bring him out to thy gates ,” i. e. , to one of the gates of the town in which the crime was committed. By the gates we are to understand the open space near the gates, where the judicial proceedings took place (cf.

Neh 8:1, Neh 8:3; Job. Deu 29:7), the sentence itself being executed outside the town (cf. Deu 22:24; Act 7:58; Heb 13:12), just as it had been outside the camp during the journey through the wilderness (Lev 24:14; Num 15:36), to indicate the exclusion of the criminal from the congregation, and from fellowship with God. The infliction of punishment in Deu 17:5.

is like that prescribed in Deu 13:10-11, for those who tempted others to idolatry; with this exception, that the testimony of more than one witness was required before the sentence could be executed, and the witnesses were to be the first to lift up their hands against the criminal to stone him, that they might thereby give a practical proof of the truth of their statement, and their own firm conviction that the condemned was deserving of death, - “a rule which would naturally lead to the supposition that no man would come forward as a witness without the fullest certainty or the greatest depravity” (Schnell, das isr. Recht).

המּת (Deu 17:6), the man exposed to death, who was therefore really ipso facto already dead. “ So shalt thou put the evil away ,” etc. : cf. Deu 13:6.

Deu 17:2-7 If such a case should occur, as that a man or woman transgressed the covenant of the Lord and went after other gods and worshipped them; when it was made known, the facts were to be carefully inquired into; and if the charge were substantiated, the criminal was to be led out to the gate and stoned. On the testimony of two or three witnesses, not of one only, he was to be put to death (see at Num 35:30); and the hand of the witnesses was to be against him first to put him to death, i.

e. , to throw the first stones at him, and all the people were to follow. With regard to the different kinds of idolatry in Deu 17:3, see Deu 4:19. (On Deu 17:4, see Deu 13:15.) “ Bring him out to thy gates ,” i. e. , to one of the gates of the town in which the crime was committed. By the gates we are to understand the open space near the gates, where the judicial proceedings took place (cf.

Neh 8:1, Neh 8:3; Job. Deu 29:7), the sentence itself being executed outside the town (cf. Deu 22:24; Act 7:58; Heb 13:12), just as it had been outside the camp during the journey through the wilderness (Lev 24:14; Num 15:36), to indicate the exclusion of the criminal from the congregation, and from fellowship with God. The infliction of punishment in Deu 17:5.

is like that prescribed in Deu 13:10-11, for those who tempted others to idolatry; with this exception, that the testimony of more than one witness was required before the sentence could be executed, and the witnesses were to be the first to lift up their hands against the criminal to stone him, that they might thereby give a practical proof of the truth of their statement, and their own firm conviction that the condemned was deserving of death, - “a rule which would naturally lead to the supposition that no man would come forward as a witness without the fullest certainty or the greatest depravity” (Schnell, das isr. Recht).

המּת (Deu 17:6), the man exposed to death, who was therefore really ipso facto already dead. “ So shalt thou put the evil away ,” etc. : cf. Deu 13:6.

Deu 17:2-7 If such a case should occur, as that a man or woman transgressed the covenant of the Lord and went after other gods and worshipped them; when it was made known, the facts were to be carefully inquired into; and if the charge were substantiated, the criminal was to be led out to the gate and stoned. On the testimony of two or three witnesses, not of one only, he was to be put to death (see at Num 35:30); and the hand of the witnesses was to be against him first to put him to death, i.

e. , to throw the first stones at him, and all the people were to follow. With regard to the different kinds of idolatry in Deu 17:3, see Deu 4:19. (On Deu 17:4, see Deu 13:15.) “ Bring him out to thy gates ,” i. e. , to one of the gates of the town in which the crime was committed. By the gates we are to understand the open space near the gates, where the judicial proceedings took place (cf.

Neh 8:1, Neh 8:3; Job. Deu 29:7), the sentence itself being executed outside the town (cf. Deu 22:24; Act 7:58; Heb 13:12), just as it had been outside the camp during the journey through the wilderness (Lev 24:14; Num 15:36), to indicate the exclusion of the criminal from the congregation, and from fellowship with God. The infliction of punishment in Deu 17:5.

is like that prescribed in Deu 13:10-11, for those who tempted others to idolatry; with this exception, that the testimony of more than one witness was required before the sentence could be executed, and the witnesses were to be the first to lift up their hands against the criminal to stone him, that they might thereby give a practical proof of the truth of their statement, and their own firm conviction that the condemned was deserving of death, - “a rule which would naturally lead to the supposition that no man would come forward as a witness without the fullest certainty or the greatest depravity” (Schnell, das isr. Recht).

המּת (Deu 17:6), the man exposed to death, who was therefore really ipso facto already dead. “ So shalt thou put the evil away ,” etc. : cf. Deu 13:6.

Deu 17:8-13 The Higher Judicial Court at the Place of the Sanctuary. - Just as the judges appointed at Sinai were to bring to Moses whatever cases were too difficult for them to decide, that he might judge them according to the decision of God (Exo 18:26 and Exo 18:19); so in the future the judges of the different towns were to bring all difficult cases, which they were unable to decide, before the Levitical priests and judges at the place of the sanctuary, that a final decision might be given there.

Deu 17:8-9 “ If there is to thee a matter too marvellous for judgment (נפלא with מן, too wonderful, incomprehensible, or beyond carrying out, Gen 18:14, i. e. , too difficult to give a judicial decision upon), between blood and blood, plea and plea, stroke and stroke (i. e. , too hard for you to decide according to what legal provisions a fatal blow, or dispute on some civil matter, or a bodily injury, is to be settled), disputes in thy gates (a loosely arranged apposition in this sense, dispute of different kinds, such as shall arise in thy towns); arise, and get thee to the place which Jehovah thy God shall choose; and go to the Levitical priest and the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire .

” Israel is addressed here as a nation, but the words are not to be supposed to be directed “first of all to the local courts (Deu 16:18), and lastly to the contending parties” ( Knobel ), nor “directly to the parties to the suit” ( Schultz ), but simply to the persons whose duty it was to administer justice in the nation, i. e. , to the regular judges in the different towns and districts of the land.

This is evident from the general fact, that the Mosaic law never recognises any appeal to higher courts by the different parties to a lawsuit, and that in this case also it is not assumed, since all that is enjoined is, that if the matter should be too difficult for the local judges to decide, they themselves were to carry it to the superior court. As Oehler has quite correctly observed in Herzog's Cyclopaedia, “this superior court was not a court of appeal; for it did not adjudicate after the local court had already given a verdict, but in cases in which the latter would not trust itself to give a verdict at all.

” And this is more especially evident from what is stated in Deu 17:10, with regard to the decisions of the superior court, namely, that they were to do whatever the superior judges taught, without deviating to the right hand or to the left. This is unquestionably far more applicable to the judges of the different towns, who were to carry out exactly the sentence of the higher tribunal, than to the parties to the suit, inasmuch as the latter, at all events those who were condemned for blood (i.

e. , for murder), could not possibly be in a position to alter the decision of the court at pleasure, since it did not rest with them, but with the authorities of their town, to carry out the sentence. Moses did not directly institute a superior tribunal at the place of the sanctuary on this occasion, but rather assumed its existence; not however its existence at that time (as Riehm and other modern critics suppose), but its establishment and existence in the future.

Just as he gives no minute directions concerning the organization of the different local courts, but leaves this to the natural development of the judicial institutions already in existence, so he also restricts himself, so far as the higher court is concerned, to general allusions, which might serve as a guide to the national rulers of a future day, to organize it according to the existing models. He had no disorganized mob before him, but a well-ordered nation, already in possession of civil institutions, with fruitful germs for further expansion and organization.

In addition to its civil classification into tribes, families, fathers’ houses, and family groups, which possessed at once their rulers in their own heads, the nation had received in the priesthood, with the high priest at the head, and the Levites as their assistants, a spiritual class, which mediated between the congregation and the Lord, and not only kept up the knowledge of right in the people as the guardian of the law, but by virtue of the high priest’s office was able to lay the rights of the people before God, and in difficult cases could ask for His decision. Moreover, a leader had already been appointed for the nation, for the time immediately succeeding Moses’ death; and in this nomination of Joshua, a pledge had been given that the Lord would never leave it without a supreme ruler of its civil affairs, but, along with the high priest, would also appoint a judge at the place of the central sanctuary, who would administer justice in the highest court in association with the priests.

On the ground of these facts, sit was enough for the future to mention the Levitical priests and the judge who would be at the place of the sanctuary, as constituting the court by which the difficult questions were to be decided. For instance, the words themselves show distinctly enough, that by “the judge” we are not to understand the high priest, but the temporal judge or president of the superior court; and it is evident from the singular, “ the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord ” (Deu 17:12), that the high priest is included among the priests.

The expression “ the priests the Levites ” (Levitical priests), which also occurs in Deu 17:18; Deu 18:1; Deu 21:5; Deu 24:8; Deu 27:9; Deu 31:9, instead of “sons of Aaron,” which we find in the middle books, is quite in harmony with the time and character of the book before us. As long as Aaron was living with his sons, the priesthood consisted only of himself and his sons, that is to say, of one family.

Hence all the instructions in the middle books are addressed to them, and for the most part to Aaron personally (vid. , Ex 28 and 29; Lev 8-10; Num 18:1, etc.) This as all changed when Aaron died; henceforth the priesthood consisted simply of the descendants of Aaron and his sons, who were no longer one family, but formed a distinct class in the nation, the legitimacy of which arose from its connection with the tribe of Levi, to which Aaron himself had belonged.

It was evidently more appropriate, therefore, to describe them as sons of Levi than as sons of Aaron, which had been the title formerly given to the priests, with the exception of the high priest, viz. , Aaron himself. - In connection with the superior court, however, the priests are introduced rather as knowing and teaching the law (Lev 10:11), than as actual judges.

For this reason appeal was to be made not only to them, but also to the judge, whose duty it was in any case to make the judicial inquiry and pronounce the sentence. - The object of the verb “ inquire ” (Deu 17:9) follows after “they shall show thee,” viz. , “ the word of right ,” the judicial sentence which is sought (2Ch 19:6).

Deu 17:8-13 The Higher Judicial Court at the Place of the Sanctuary. - Just as the judges appointed at Sinai were to bring to Moses whatever cases were too difficult for them to decide, that he might judge them according to the decision of God (Exo 18:26 and Exo 18:19); so in the future the judges of the different towns were to bring all difficult cases, which they were unable to decide, before the Levitical priests and judges at the place of the sanctuary, that a final decision might be given there.

Deu 17:8-9 “ If there is to thee a matter too marvellous for judgment (נפלא with מן, too wonderful, incomprehensible, or beyond carrying out, Gen 18:14, i. e. , too difficult to give a judicial decision upon), between blood and blood, plea and plea, stroke and stroke (i. e. , too hard for you to decide according to what legal provisions a fatal blow, or dispute on some civil matter, or a bodily injury, is to be settled), disputes in thy gates (a loosely arranged apposition in this sense, dispute of different kinds, such as shall arise in thy towns); arise, and get thee to the place which Jehovah thy God shall choose; and go to the Levitical priest and the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire .

” Israel is addressed here as a nation, but the words are not to be supposed to be directed “first of all to the local courts (Deu 16:18), and lastly to the contending parties” ( Knobel ), nor “directly to the parties to the suit” ( Schultz ), but simply to the persons whose duty it was to administer justice in the nation, i. e. , to the regular judges in the different towns and districts of the land.

This is evident from the general fact, that the Mosaic law never recognises any appeal to higher courts by the different parties to a lawsuit, and that in this case also it is not assumed, since all that is enjoined is, that if the matter should be too difficult for the local judges to decide, they themselves were to carry it to the superior court. As Oehler has quite correctly observed in Herzog's Cyclopaedia, “this superior court was not a court of appeal; for it did not adjudicate after the local court had already given a verdict, but in cases in which the latter would not trust itself to give a verdict at all.

” And this is more especially evident from what is stated in Deu 17:10, with regard to the decisions of the superior court, namely, that they were to do whatever the superior judges taught, without deviating to the right hand or to the left. This is unquestionably far more applicable to the judges of the different towns, who were to carry out exactly the sentence of the higher tribunal, than to the parties to the suit, inasmuch as the latter, at all events those who were condemned for blood (i.

e. , for murder), could not possibly be in a position to alter the decision of the court at pleasure, since it did not rest with them, but with the authorities of their town, to carry out the sentence. Moses did not directly institute a superior tribunal at the place of the sanctuary on this occasion, but rather assumed its existence; not however its existence at that time (as Riehm and other modern critics suppose), but its establishment and existence in the future.

Just as he gives no minute directions concerning the organization of the different local courts, but leaves this to the natural development of the judicial institutions already in existence, so he also restricts himself, so far as the higher court is concerned, to general allusions, which might serve as a guide to the national rulers of a future day, to organize it according to the existing models. He had no disorganized mob before him, but a well-ordered nation, already in possession of civil institutions, with fruitful germs for further expansion and organization.

In addition to its civil classification into tribes, families, fathers’ houses, and family groups, which possessed at once their rulers in their own heads, the nation had received in the priesthood, with the high priest at the head, and the Levites as their assistants, a spiritual class, which mediated between the congregation and the Lord, and not only kept up the knowledge of right in the people as the guardian of the law, but by virtue of the high priest’s office was able to lay the rights of the people before God, and in difficult cases could ask for His decision. Moreover, a leader had already been appointed for the nation, for the time immediately succeeding Moses’ death; and in this nomination of Joshua, a pledge had been given that the Lord would never leave it without a supreme ruler of its civil affairs, but, along with the high priest, would also appoint a judge at the place of the central sanctuary, who would administer justice in the highest court in association with the priests.

On the ground of these facts, sit was enough for the future to mention the Levitical priests and the judge who would be at the place of the sanctuary, as constituting the court by which the difficult questions were to be decided. For instance, the words themselves show distinctly enough, that by “the judge” we are not to understand the high priest, but the temporal judge or president of the superior court; and it is evident from the singular, “ the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord ” (Deu 17:12), that the high priest is included among the priests.

The expression “ the priests the Levites ” (Levitical priests), which also occurs in Deu 17:18; Deu 18:1; Deu 21:5; Deu 24:8; Deu 27:9; Deu 31:9, instead of “sons of Aaron,” which we find in the middle books, is quite in harmony with the time and character of the book before us. As long as Aaron was living with his sons, the priesthood consisted only of himself and his sons, that is to say, of one family.

Hence all the instructions in the middle books are addressed to them, and for the most part to Aaron personally (vid. , Ex 28 and 29; Lev 8-10; Num 18:1, etc.) This as all changed when Aaron died; henceforth the priesthood consisted simply of the descendants of Aaron and his sons, who were no longer one family, but formed a distinct class in the nation, the legitimacy of which arose from its connection with the tribe of Levi, to which Aaron himself had belonged.

It was evidently more appropriate, therefore, to describe them as sons of Levi than as sons of Aaron, which had been the title formerly given to the priests, with the exception of the high priest, viz. , Aaron himself. - In connection with the superior court, however, the priests are introduced rather as knowing and teaching the law (Lev 10:11), than as actual judges.

For this reason appeal was to be made not only to them, but also to the judge, whose duty it was in any case to make the judicial inquiry and pronounce the sentence. - The object of the verb “ inquire ” (Deu 17:9) follows after “they shall show thee,” viz. , “ the word of right ,” the judicial sentence which is sought (2Ch 19:6).

Deu 17:8-13 The Higher Judicial Court at the Place of the Sanctuary. - Just as the judges appointed at Sinai were to bring to Moses whatever cases were too difficult for them to decide, that he might judge them according to the decision of God (Exo 18:26 and Exo 18:19); so in the future the judges of the different towns were to bring all difficult cases, which they were unable to decide, before the Levitical priests and judges at the place of the sanctuary, that a final decision might be given there.

Deu 17:8-9 “ If there is to thee a matter too marvellous for judgment (נפלא with מן, too wonderful, incomprehensible, or beyond carrying out, Gen 18:14, i. e. , too difficult to give a judicial decision upon), between blood and blood, plea and plea, stroke and stroke (i. e. , too hard for you to decide according to what legal provisions a fatal blow, or dispute on some civil matter, or a bodily injury, is to be settled), disputes in thy gates (a loosely arranged apposition in this sense, dispute of different kinds, such as shall arise in thy towns); arise, and get thee to the place which Jehovah thy God shall choose; and go to the Levitical priest and the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire .

” Israel is addressed here as a nation, but the words are not to be supposed to be directed “first of all to the local courts (Deu 16:18), and lastly to the contending parties” ( Knobel ), nor “directly to the parties to the suit” ( Schultz ), but simply to the persons whose duty it was to administer justice in the nation, i. e. , to the regular judges in the different towns and districts of the land.

This is evident from the general fact, that the Mosaic law never recognises any appeal to higher courts by the different parties to a lawsuit, and that in this case also it is not assumed, since all that is enjoined is, that if the matter should be too difficult for the local judges to decide, they themselves were to carry it to the superior court. As Oehler has quite correctly observed in Herzog's Cyclopaedia, “this superior court was not a court of appeal; for it did not adjudicate after the local court had already given a verdict, but in cases in which the latter would not trust itself to give a verdict at all.

” And this is more especially evident from what is stated in Deu 17:10, with regard to the decisions of the superior court, namely, that they were to do whatever the superior judges taught, without deviating to the right hand or to the left. This is unquestionably far more applicable to the judges of the different towns, who were to carry out exactly the sentence of the higher tribunal, than to the parties to the suit, inasmuch as the latter, at all events those who were condemned for blood (i.

e. , for murder), could not possibly be in a position to alter the decision of the court at pleasure, since it did not rest with them, but with the authorities of their town, to carry out the sentence. Moses did not directly institute a superior tribunal at the place of the sanctuary on this occasion, but rather assumed its existence; not however its existence at that time (as Riehm and other modern critics suppose), but its establishment and existence in the future.

Just as he gives no minute directions concerning the organization of the different local courts, but leaves this to the natural development of the judicial institutions already in existence, so he also restricts himself, so far as the higher court is concerned, to general allusions, which might serve as a guide to the national rulers of a future day, to organize it according to the existing models. He had no disorganized mob before him, but a well-ordered nation, already in possession of civil institutions, with fruitful germs for further expansion and organization.

In addition to its civil classification into tribes, families, fathers’ houses, and family groups, which possessed at once their rulers in their own heads, the nation had received in the priesthood, with the high priest at the head, and the Levites as their assistants, a spiritual class, which mediated between the congregation and the Lord, and not only kept up the knowledge of right in the people as the guardian of the law, but by virtue of the high priest’s office was able to lay the rights of the people before God, and in difficult cases could ask for His decision. Moreover, a leader had already been appointed for the nation, for the time immediately succeeding Moses’ death; and in this nomination of Joshua, a pledge had been given that the Lord would never leave it without a supreme ruler of its civil affairs, but, along with the high priest, would also appoint a judge at the place of the central sanctuary, who would administer justice in the highest court in association with the priests.

On the ground of these facts, sit was enough for the future to mention the Levitical priests and the judge who would be at the place of the sanctuary, as constituting the court by which the difficult questions were to be decided. For instance, the words themselves show distinctly enough, that by “the judge” we are not to understand the high priest, but the temporal judge or president of the superior court; and it is evident from the singular, “ the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord ” (Deu 17:12), that the high priest is included among the priests.

The expression “ the priests the Levites ” (Levitical priests), which also occurs in Deu 17:18; Deu 18:1; Deu 21:5; Deu 24:8; Deu 27:9; Deu 31:9, instead of “sons of Aaron,” which we find in the middle books, is quite in harmony with the time and character of the book before us. As long as Aaron was living with his sons, the priesthood consisted only of himself and his sons, that is to say, of one family.

Hence all the instructions in the middle books are addressed to them, and for the most part to Aaron personally (vid. , Ex 28 and 29; Lev 8-10; Num 18:1, etc.) This as all changed when Aaron died; henceforth the priesthood consisted simply of the descendants of Aaron and his sons, who were no longer one family, but formed a distinct class in the nation, the legitimacy of which arose from its connection with the tribe of Levi, to which Aaron himself had belonged.

It was evidently more appropriate, therefore, to describe them as sons of Levi than as sons of Aaron, which had been the title formerly given to the priests, with the exception of the high priest, viz. , Aaron himself. - In connection with the superior court, however, the priests are introduced rather as knowing and teaching the law (Lev 10:11), than as actual judges.

For this reason appeal was to be made not only to them, but also to the judge, whose duty it was in any case to make the judicial inquiry and pronounce the sentence. - The object of the verb “ inquire ” (Deu 17:9) follows after “they shall show thee,” viz. , “ the word of right ,” the judicial sentence which is sought (2Ch 19:6).

Deu 17:8-13 The Higher Judicial Court at the Place of the Sanctuary. - Just as the judges appointed at Sinai were to bring to Moses whatever cases were too difficult for them to decide, that he might judge them according to the decision of God (Exo 18:26 and Exo 18:19); so in the future the judges of the different towns were to bring all difficult cases, which they were unable to decide, before the Levitical priests and judges at the place of the sanctuary, that a final decision might be given there.

Deu 17:8-9 “ If there is to thee a matter too marvellous for judgment (נפלא with מן, too wonderful, incomprehensible, or beyond carrying out, Gen 18:14, i. e. , too difficult to give a judicial decision upon), between blood and blood, plea and plea, stroke and stroke (i. e. , too hard for you to decide according to what legal provisions a fatal blow, or dispute on some civil matter, or a bodily injury, is to be settled), disputes in thy gates (a loosely arranged apposition in this sense, dispute of different kinds, such as shall arise in thy towns); arise, and get thee to the place which Jehovah thy God shall choose; and go to the Levitical priest and the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire .

” Israel is addressed here as a nation, but the words are not to be supposed to be directed “first of all to the local courts (Deu 16:18), and lastly to the contending parties” ( Knobel ), nor “directly to the parties to the suit” ( Schultz ), but simply to the persons whose duty it was to administer justice in the nation, i. e. , to the regular judges in the different towns and districts of the land.

This is evident from the general fact, that the Mosaic law never recognises any appeal to higher courts by the different parties to a lawsuit, and that in this case also it is not assumed, since all that is enjoined is, that if the matter should be too difficult for the local judges to decide, they themselves were to carry it to the superior court. As Oehler has quite correctly observed in Herzog's Cyclopaedia, “this superior court was not a court of appeal; for it did not adjudicate after the local court had already given a verdict, but in cases in which the latter would not trust itself to give a verdict at all.

” And this is more especially evident from what is stated in Deu 17:10, with regard to the decisions of the superior court, namely, that they were to do whatever the superior judges taught, without deviating to the right hand or to the left. This is unquestionably far more applicable to the judges of the different towns, who were to carry out exactly the sentence of the higher tribunal, than to the parties to the suit, inasmuch as the latter, at all events those who were condemned for blood (i.

e. , for murder), could not possibly be in a position to alter the decision of the court at pleasure, since it did not rest with them, but with the authorities of their town, to carry out the sentence. Moses did not directly institute a superior tribunal at the place of the sanctuary on this occasion, but rather assumed its existence; not however its existence at that time (as Riehm and other modern critics suppose), but its establishment and existence in the future.

Just as he gives no minute directions concerning the organization of the different local courts, but leaves this to the natural development of the judicial institutions already in existence, so he also restricts himself, so far as the higher court is concerned, to general allusions, which might serve as a guide to the national rulers of a future day, to organize it according to the existing models. He had no disorganized mob before him, but a well-ordered nation, already in possession of civil institutions, with fruitful germs for further expansion and organization.

In addition to its civil classification into tribes, families, fathers’ houses, and family groups, which possessed at once their rulers in their own heads, the nation had received in the priesthood, with the high priest at the head, and the Levites as their assistants, a spiritual class, which mediated between the congregation and the Lord, and not only kept up the knowledge of right in the people as the guardian of the law, but by virtue of the high priest’s office was able to lay the rights of the people before God, and in difficult cases could ask for His decision. Moreover, a leader had already been appointed for the nation, for the time immediately succeeding Moses’ death; and in this nomination of Joshua, a pledge had been given that the Lord would never leave it without a supreme ruler of its civil affairs, but, along with the high priest, would also appoint a judge at the place of the central sanctuary, who would administer justice in the highest court in association with the priests.

On the ground of these facts, sit was enough for the future to mention the Levitical priests and the judge who would be at the place of the sanctuary, as constituting the court by which the difficult questions were to be decided. For instance, the words themselves show distinctly enough, that by “the judge” we are not to understand the high priest, but the temporal judge or president of the superior court; and it is evident from the singular, “ the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord ” (Deu 17:12), that the high priest is included among the priests.

The expression “ the priests the Levites ” (Levitical priests), which also occurs in Deu 17:18; Deu 18:1; Deu 21:5; Deu 24:8; Deu 27:9; Deu 31:9, instead of “sons of Aaron,” which we find in the middle books, is quite in harmony with the time and character of the book before us. As long as Aaron was living with his sons, the priesthood consisted only of himself and his sons, that is to say, of one family.

Hence all the instructions in the middle books are addressed to them, and for the most part to Aaron personally (vid. , Ex 28 and 29; Lev 8-10; Num 18:1, etc.) This as all changed when Aaron died; henceforth the priesthood consisted simply of the descendants of Aaron and his sons, who were no longer one family, but formed a distinct class in the nation, the legitimacy of which arose from its connection with the tribe of Levi, to which Aaron himself had belonged.

It was evidently more appropriate, therefore, to describe them as sons of Levi than as sons of Aaron, which had been the title formerly given to the priests, with the exception of the high priest, viz. , Aaron himself. - In connection with the superior court, however, the priests are introduced rather as knowing and teaching the law (Lev 10:11), than as actual judges.

For this reason appeal was to be made not only to them, but also to the judge, whose duty it was in any case to make the judicial inquiry and pronounce the sentence. - The object of the verb “ inquire ” (Deu 17:9) follows after “they shall show thee,” viz. , “ the word of right ,” the judicial sentence which is sought (2Ch 19:6).

Deu 17:8-13 The Higher Judicial Court at the Place of the Sanctuary. - Just as the judges appointed at Sinai were to bring to Moses whatever cases were too difficult for them to decide, that he might judge them according to the decision of God (Exo 18:26 and Exo 18:19); so in the future the judges of the different towns were to bring all difficult cases, which they were unable to decide, before the Levitical priests and judges at the place of the sanctuary, that a final decision might be given there.

Deu 17:8-9 “ If there is to thee a matter too marvellous for judgment (נפלא with מן, too wonderful, incomprehensible, or beyond carrying out, Gen 18:14, i. e. , too difficult to give a judicial decision upon), between blood and blood, plea and plea, stroke and stroke (i. e. , too hard for you to decide according to what legal provisions a fatal blow, or dispute on some civil matter, or a bodily injury, is to be settled), disputes in thy gates (a loosely arranged apposition in this sense, dispute of different kinds, such as shall arise in thy towns); arise, and get thee to the place which Jehovah thy God shall choose; and go to the Levitical priest and the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire .

” Israel is addressed here as a nation, but the words are not to be supposed to be directed “first of all to the local courts (Deu 16:18), and lastly to the contending parties” ( Knobel ), nor “directly to the parties to the suit” ( Schultz ), but simply to the persons whose duty it was to administer justice in the nation, i. e. , to the regular judges in the different towns and districts of the land.

This is evident from the general fact, that the Mosaic law never recognises any appeal to higher courts by the different parties to a lawsuit, and that in this case also it is not assumed, since all that is enjoined is, that if the matter should be too difficult for the local judges to decide, they themselves were to carry it to the superior court. As Oehler has quite correctly observed in Herzog's Cyclopaedia, “this superior court was not a court of appeal; for it did not adjudicate after the local court had already given a verdict, but in cases in which the latter would not trust itself to give a verdict at all.

” And this is more especially evident from what is stated in Deu 17:10, with regard to the decisions of the superior court, namely, that they were to do whatever the superior judges taught, without deviating to the right hand or to the left. This is unquestionably far more applicable to the judges of the different towns, who were to carry out exactly the sentence of the higher tribunal, than to the parties to the suit, inasmuch as the latter, at all events those who were condemned for blood (i.

e. , for murder), could not possibly be in a position to alter the decision of the court at pleasure, since it did not rest with them, but with the authorities of their town, to carry out the sentence. Moses did not directly institute a superior tribunal at the place of the sanctuary on this occasion, but rather assumed its existence; not however its existence at that time (as Riehm and other modern critics suppose), but its establishment and existence in the future.

Just as he gives no minute directions concerning the organization of the different local courts, but leaves this to the natural development of the judicial institutions already in existence, so he also restricts himself, so far as the higher court is concerned, to general allusions, which might serve as a guide to the national rulers of a future day, to organize it according to the existing models. He had no disorganized mob before him, but a well-ordered nation, already in possession of civil institutions, with fruitful germs for further expansion and organization.

In addition to its civil classification into tribes, families, fathers’ houses, and family groups, which possessed at once their rulers in their own heads, the nation had received in the priesthood, with the high priest at the head, and the Levites as their assistants, a spiritual class, which mediated between the congregation and the Lord, and not only kept up the knowledge of right in the people as the guardian of the law, but by virtue of the high priest’s office was able to lay the rights of the people before God, and in difficult cases could ask for His decision. Moreover, a leader had already been appointed for the nation, for the time immediately succeeding Moses’ death; and in this nomination of Joshua, a pledge had been given that the Lord would never leave it without a supreme ruler of its civil affairs, but, along with the high priest, would also appoint a judge at the place of the central sanctuary, who would administer justice in the highest court in association with the priests.

On the ground of these facts, sit was enough for the future to mention the Levitical priests and the judge who would be at the place of the sanctuary, as constituting the court by which the difficult questions were to be decided. For instance, the words themselves show distinctly enough, that by “the judge” we are not to understand the high priest, but the temporal judge or president of the superior court; and it is evident from the singular, “ the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord ” (Deu 17:12), that the high priest is included among the priests.

The expression “ the priests the Levites ” (Levitical priests), which also occurs in Deu 17:18; Deu 18:1; Deu 21:5; Deu 24:8; Deu 27:9; Deu 31:9, instead of “sons of Aaron,” which we find in the middle books, is quite in harmony with the time and character of the book before us. As long as Aaron was living with his sons, the priesthood consisted only of himself and his sons, that is to say, of one family.

Hence all the instructions in the middle books are addressed to them, and for the most part to Aaron personally (vid. , Ex 28 and 29; Lev 8-10; Num 18:1, etc.) This as all changed when Aaron died; henceforth the priesthood consisted simply of the descendants of Aaron and his sons, who were no longer one family, but formed a distinct class in the nation, the legitimacy of which arose from its connection with the tribe of Levi, to which Aaron himself had belonged.

It was evidently more appropriate, therefore, to describe them as sons of Levi than as sons of Aaron, which had been the title formerly given to the priests, with the exception of the high priest, viz. , Aaron himself. - In connection with the superior court, however, the priests are introduced rather as knowing and teaching the law (Lev 10:11), than as actual judges.

For this reason appeal was to be made not only to them, but also to the judge, whose duty it was in any case to make the judicial inquiry and pronounce the sentence. - The object of the verb “ inquire ” (Deu 17:9) follows after “they shall show thee,” viz. , “ the word of right ,” the judicial sentence which is sought (2Ch 19:6).

Deu 17:8-13 The Higher Judicial Court at the Place of the Sanctuary. - Just as the judges appointed at Sinai were to bring to Moses whatever cases were too difficult for them to decide, that he might judge them according to the decision of God (Exo 18:26 and Exo 18:19); so in the future the judges of the different towns were to bring all difficult cases, which they were unable to decide, before the Levitical priests and judges at the place of the sanctuary, that a final decision might be given there.

Deu 17:8-9 “ If there is to thee a matter too marvellous for judgment (נפלא with מן, too wonderful, incomprehensible, or beyond carrying out, Gen 18:14, i. e. , too difficult to give a judicial decision upon), between blood and blood, plea and plea, stroke and stroke (i. e. , too hard for you to decide according to what legal provisions a fatal blow, or dispute on some civil matter, or a bodily injury, is to be settled), disputes in thy gates (a loosely arranged apposition in this sense, dispute of different kinds, such as shall arise in thy towns); arise, and get thee to the place which Jehovah thy God shall choose; and go to the Levitical priest and the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire .

” Israel is addressed here as a nation, but the words are not to be supposed to be directed “first of all to the local courts (Deu 16:18), and lastly to the contending parties” ( Knobel ), nor “directly to the parties to the suit” ( Schultz ), but simply to the persons whose duty it was to administer justice in the nation, i. e. , to the regular judges in the different towns and districts of the land.

This is evident from the general fact, that the Mosaic law never recognises any appeal to higher courts by the different parties to a lawsuit, and that in this case also it is not assumed, since all that is enjoined is, that if the matter should be too difficult for the local judges to decide, they themselves were to carry it to the superior court. As Oehler has quite correctly observed in Herzog's Cyclopaedia, “this superior court was not a court of appeal; for it did not adjudicate after the local court had already given a verdict, but in cases in which the latter would not trust itself to give a verdict at all.

” And this is more especially evident from what is stated in Deu 17:10, with regard to the decisions of the superior court, namely, that they were to do whatever the superior judges taught, without deviating to the right hand or to the left. This is unquestionably far more applicable to the judges of the different towns, who were to carry out exactly the sentence of the higher tribunal, than to the parties to the suit, inasmuch as the latter, at all events those who were condemned for blood (i.

e. , for murder), could not possibly be in a position to alter the decision of the court at pleasure, since it did not rest with them, but with the authorities of their town, to carry out the sentence. Moses did not directly institute a superior tribunal at the place of the sanctuary on this occasion, but rather assumed its existence; not however its existence at that time (as Riehm and other modern critics suppose), but its establishment and existence in the future.

Just as he gives no minute directions concerning the organization of the different local courts, but leaves this to the natural development of the judicial institutions already in existence, so he also restricts himself, so far as the higher court is concerned, to general allusions, which might serve as a guide to the national rulers of a future day, to organize it according to the existing models. He had no disorganized mob before him, but a well-ordered nation, already in possession of civil institutions, with fruitful germs for further expansion and organization.

In addition to its civil classification into tribes, families, fathers’ houses, and family groups, which possessed at once their rulers in their own heads, the nation had received in the priesthood, with the high priest at the head, and the Levites as their assistants, a spiritual class, which mediated between the congregation and the Lord, and not only kept up the knowledge of right in the people as the guardian of the law, but by virtue of the high priest’s office was able to lay the rights of the people before God, and in difficult cases could ask for His decision. Moreover, a leader had already been appointed for the nation, for the time immediately succeeding Moses’ death; and in this nomination of Joshua, a pledge had been given that the Lord would never leave it without a supreme ruler of its civil affairs, but, along with the high priest, would also appoint a judge at the place of the central sanctuary, who would administer justice in the highest court in association with the priests.

On the ground of these facts, sit was enough for the future to mention the Levitical priests and the judge who would be at the place of the sanctuary, as constituting the court by which the difficult questions were to be decided. For instance, the words themselves show distinctly enough, that by “the judge” we are not to understand the high priest, but the temporal judge or president of the superior court; and it is evident from the singular, “ the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord ” (Deu 17:12), that the high priest is included among the priests.

The expression “ the priests the Levites ” (Levitical priests), which also occurs in Deu 17:18; Deu 18:1; Deu 21:5; Deu 24:8; Deu 27:9; Deu 31:9, instead of “sons of Aaron,” which we find in the middle books, is quite in harmony with the time and character of the book before us. As long as Aaron was living with his sons, the priesthood consisted only of himself and his sons, that is to say, of one family.

Hence all the instructions in the middle books are addressed to them, and for the most part to Aaron personally (vid. , Ex 28 and 29; Lev 8-10; Num 18:1, etc.) This as all changed when Aaron died; henceforth the priesthood consisted simply of the descendants of Aaron and his sons, who were no longer one family, but formed a distinct class in the nation, the legitimacy of which arose from its connection with the tribe of Levi, to which Aaron himself had belonged.

It was evidently more appropriate, therefore, to describe them as sons of Levi than as sons of Aaron, which had been the title formerly given to the priests, with the exception of the high priest, viz. , Aaron himself. - In connection with the superior court, however, the priests are introduced rather as knowing and teaching the law (Lev 10:11), than as actual judges.

For this reason appeal was to be made not only to them, but also to the judge, whose duty it was in any case to make the judicial inquiry and pronounce the sentence. - The object of the verb “ inquire ” (Deu 17:9) follows after “they shall show thee,” viz. , “ the word of right ,” the judicial sentence which is sought (2Ch 19:6).

Deu 17:14-17 Choice and Right of the King. - Deu 17:14, Deu 17:15. If Israel, when dwelling in the land which was given it by the Lord for a possession, should wish to appoint a king, like all the nations round about, it was to appoint the man whom Jehovah its God should choose, and that from among its brethren, i. e. , from its own people, not a foreigner or non-Israelite.

The earthly kingdom in Israel was not opposed to the theocracy, i. e. , to the rule of Jehovah as king over the people of His possession, provided no one was made king but the person whom Jehovah should choose. The appointment of a king is not commanded , like the institution of judges (Deu 16:18), because Israel could exist under the government of Jehovah, even without an earthly king; it is simply permitted , in case the need should arise for a regal government.

There was no necessity to describe more minutely the course to be adopted, as the people possessed the natural provision for the administration of their national affairs in their well-organized tribes, by whom this point could be decided. Moses also omits to state more particularly in what way Jehovah would make known the choice of the king to be appointed. The congregation, no doubt, possessed one means of asking the will of the Lord in the Urim and Thummim of the high priest, provided the Lord did not reveal His will in a different manner, namely through a prophet, as He did in the election of Saul and David (1 Sam 8-9, and 16).

The commandment not to choose a foreigner, acknowledged the right of the nation to choose. Consequently the choice on the part of the Lord may have consisted simply in His pointing out to the people, in a very evident manner, the person they were to elect, or in His confirming the choice by word and act, as in accordance with His will. Three rules are laid down for the king himself in Deu 17:16-20.

In the first place, he was not to keep many horses, or lead back the people to Egypt, to multiply horses, because Jehovah had forbidden the people to return thither by that way. The notion of modern critics, that there is an allusion in this prohibition to the constitution of the kingdom under Solomon, is so far from having any foundation, that the reason assigned - namely, the fear lest the king should lead back the people to Egypt from his love of horses, “to the end that he should multiply horses” - really precludes the time of Solomon, inasmuch as the time had then long gone by when any thought could have been entertained of leading back the people to Egypt.

But such a reason would be quite in its place in Moses’ time, and only then, “when it would not seem impossible to reunite the broken band, and when the people were ready to express their longing, and even their intention, to return to Egypt on the very slightest occasion; whereas the reason assigned for the prohibition might have furnished Solomon with an excuse for regarding the prohibition itself as merely a temporary one, which was no longer binding” ( Oehler in Herzog’s Cyclopaedia: vid. , Hengstenberg’s Dissertations ).

The second admonition also, that the king was not to take to himself many wives, and turn away his heart (sc. , from the Lord), nor greatly multiply to himself silver and gold, can be explained without the hypothesis that there is an allusion to Solomon’s reign, although this king did transgress both commands (1Ki 10:14. Deu 11:1.) A richly furnished harem, and the accumulation of silver and gold, were inseparably connected with the luxury of Oriental monarchs generally; so that the fear was a very natural one, that the future king of Israel might follow the general customs of the heathen in these respects.

Deu 17:14-17 Choice and Right of the King. - Deu 17:14, Deu 17:15. If Israel, when dwelling in the land which was given it by the Lord for a possession, should wish to appoint a king, like all the nations round about, it was to appoint the man whom Jehovah its God should choose, and that from among its brethren, i. e. , from its own people, not a foreigner or non-Israelite.

The earthly kingdom in Israel was not opposed to the theocracy, i. e. , to the rule of Jehovah as king over the people of His possession, provided no one was made king but the person whom Jehovah should choose. The appointment of a king is not commanded , like the institution of judges (Deu 16:18), because Israel could exist under the government of Jehovah, even without an earthly king; it is simply permitted , in case the need should arise for a regal government.

There was no necessity to describe more minutely the course to be adopted, as the people possessed the natural provision for the administration of their national affairs in their well-organized tribes, by whom this point could be decided. Moses also omits to state more particularly in what way Jehovah would make known the choice of the king to be appointed. The congregation, no doubt, possessed one means of asking the will of the Lord in the Urim and Thummim of the high priest, provided the Lord did not reveal His will in a different manner, namely through a prophet, as He did in the election of Saul and David (1 Sam 8-9, and 16).

The commandment not to choose a foreigner, acknowledged the right of the nation to choose. Consequently the choice on the part of the Lord may have consisted simply in His pointing out to the people, in a very evident manner, the person they were to elect, or in His confirming the choice by word and act, as in accordance with His will. Three rules are laid down for the king himself in Deu 17:16-20.

In the first place, he was not to keep many horses, or lead back the people to Egypt, to multiply horses, because Jehovah had forbidden the people to return thither by that way. The notion of modern critics, that there is an allusion in this prohibition to the constitution of the kingdom under Solomon, is so far from having any foundation, that the reason assigned - namely, the fear lest the king should lead back the people to Egypt from his love of horses, “to the end that he should multiply horses” - really precludes the time of Solomon, inasmuch as the time had then long gone by when any thought could have been entertained of leading back the people to Egypt.

But such a reason would be quite in its place in Moses’ time, and only then, “when it would not seem impossible to reunite the broken band, and when the people were ready to express their longing, and even their intention, to return to Egypt on the very slightest occasion; whereas the reason assigned for the prohibition might have furnished Solomon with an excuse for regarding the prohibition itself as merely a temporary one, which was no longer binding” ( Oehler in Herzog’s Cyclopaedia: vid. , Hengstenberg’s Dissertations ).

The second admonition also, that the king was not to take to himself many wives, and turn away his heart (sc. , from the Lord), nor greatly multiply to himself silver and gold, can be explained without the hypothesis that there is an allusion to Solomon’s reign, although this king did transgress both commands (1Ki 10:14. Deu 11:1.) A richly furnished harem, and the accumulation of silver and gold, were inseparably connected with the luxury of Oriental monarchs generally; so that the fear was a very natural one, that the future king of Israel might follow the general customs of the heathen in these respects.

Deu 17:14-17 Choice and Right of the King. - Deu 17:14, Deu 17:15. If Israel, when dwelling in the land which was given it by the Lord for a possession, should wish to appoint a king, like all the nations round about, it was to appoint the man whom Jehovah its God should choose, and that from among its brethren, i. e. , from its own people, not a foreigner or non-Israelite.

The earthly kingdom in Israel was not opposed to the theocracy, i. e. , to the rule of Jehovah as king over the people of His possession, provided no one was made king but the person whom Jehovah should choose. The appointment of a king is not commanded , like the institution of judges (Deu 16:18), because Israel could exist under the government of Jehovah, even without an earthly king; it is simply permitted , in case the need should arise for a regal government.

There was no necessity to describe more minutely the course to be adopted, as the people possessed the natural provision for the administration of their national affairs in their well-organized tribes, by whom this point could be decided. Moses also omits to state more particularly in what way Jehovah would make known the choice of the king to be appointed. The congregation, no doubt, possessed one means of asking the will of the Lord in the Urim and Thummim of the high priest, provided the Lord did not reveal His will in a different manner, namely through a prophet, as He did in the election of Saul and David (1 Sam 8-9, and 16).

The commandment not to choose a foreigner, acknowledged the right of the nation to choose. Consequently the choice on the part of the Lord may have consisted simply in His pointing out to the people, in a very evident manner, the person they were to elect, or in His confirming the choice by word and act, as in accordance with His will. Three rules are laid down for the king himself in Deu 17:16-20.

In the first place, he was not to keep many horses, or lead back the people to Egypt, to multiply horses, because Jehovah had forbidden the people to return thither by that way. The notion of modern critics, that there is an allusion in this prohibition to the constitution of the kingdom under Solomon, is so far from having any foundation, that the reason assigned - namely, the fear lest the king should lead back the people to Egypt from his love of horses, “to the end that he should multiply horses” - really precludes the time of Solomon, inasmuch as the time had then long gone by when any thought could have been entertained of leading back the people to Egypt.

But such a reason would be quite in its place in Moses’ time, and only then, “when it would not seem impossible to reunite the broken band, and when the people were ready to express their longing, and even their intention, to return to Egypt on the very slightest occasion; whereas the reason assigned for the prohibition might have furnished Solomon with an excuse for regarding the prohibition itself as merely a temporary one, which was no longer binding” ( Oehler in Herzog’s Cyclopaedia: vid. , Hengstenberg’s Dissertations ).

The second admonition also, that the king was not to take to himself many wives, and turn away his heart (sc. , from the Lord), nor greatly multiply to himself silver and gold, can be explained without the hypothesis that there is an allusion to Solomon’s reign, although this king did transgress both commands (1Ki 10:14. Deu 11:1.) A richly furnished harem, and the accumulation of silver and gold, were inseparably connected with the luxury of Oriental monarchs generally; so that the fear was a very natural one, that the future king of Israel might follow the general customs of the heathen in these respects.

Deu 17:14-17 Choice and Right of the King. - Deu 17:14, Deu 17:15. If Israel, when dwelling in the land which was given it by the Lord for a possession, should wish to appoint a king, like all the nations round about, it was to appoint the man whom Jehovah its God should choose, and that from among its brethren, i. e. , from its own people, not a foreigner or non-Israelite.

The earthly kingdom in Israel was not opposed to the theocracy, i. e. , to the rule of Jehovah as king over the people of His possession, provided no one was made king but the person whom Jehovah should choose. The appointment of a king is not commanded , like the institution of judges (Deu 16:18), because Israel could exist under the government of Jehovah, even without an earthly king; it is simply permitted , in case the need should arise for a regal government.

There was no necessity to describe more minutely the course to be adopted, as the people possessed the natural provision for the administration of their national affairs in their well-organized tribes, by whom this point could be decided. Moses also omits to state more particularly in what way Jehovah would make known the choice of the king to be appointed. The congregation, no doubt, possessed one means of asking the will of the Lord in the Urim and Thummim of the high priest, provided the Lord did not reveal His will in a different manner, namely through a prophet, as He did in the election of Saul and David (1 Sam 8-9, and 16).

The commandment not to choose a foreigner, acknowledged the right of the nation to choose. Consequently the choice on the part of the Lord may have consisted simply in His pointing out to the people, in a very evident manner, the person they were to elect, or in His confirming the choice by word and act, as in accordance with His will. Three rules are laid down for the king himself in Deu 17:16-20.

In the first place, he was not to keep many horses, or lead back the people to Egypt, to multiply horses, because Jehovah had forbidden the people to return thither by that way. The notion of modern critics, that there is an allusion in this prohibition to the constitution of the kingdom under Solomon, is so far from having any foundation, that the reason assigned - namely, the fear lest the king should lead back the people to Egypt from his love of horses, “to the end that he should multiply horses” - really precludes the time of Solomon, inasmuch as the time had then long gone by when any thought could have been entertained of leading back the people to Egypt.

But such a reason would be quite in its place in Moses’ time, and only then, “when it would not seem impossible to reunite the broken band, and when the people were ready to express their longing, and even their intention, to return to Egypt on the very slightest occasion; whereas the reason assigned for the prohibition might have furnished Solomon with an excuse for regarding the prohibition itself as merely a temporary one, which was no longer binding” ( Oehler in Herzog’s Cyclopaedia: vid. , Hengstenberg’s Dissertations ).

The second admonition also, that the king was not to take to himself many wives, and turn away his heart (sc. , from the Lord), nor greatly multiply to himself silver and gold, can be explained without the hypothesis that there is an allusion to Solomon’s reign, although this king did transgress both commands (1Ki 10:14. Deu 11:1.) A richly furnished harem, and the accumulation of silver and gold, were inseparably connected with the luxury of Oriental monarchs generally; so that the fear was a very natural one, that the future king of Israel might follow the general customs of the heathen in these respects.

Deu 17:18-20 And thirdly , instead of hanging his heart upon these earthly things, when he at upon his royal throne he was to have a copy of the law written out by the Levitical priests, that he might keep the law by him, and read therein all the days of his life. כּתב does not involve writing with his own hand ( Philo ), but simply having it written. הזּאת התּורה משׁנה does not mean τὸ δευτερονόμιον τοῦτο (lxx), “this repetition of the law,” as הזּאת cannot stand for הזּה; but a copy of this law, as most of the Rabbins correctly explain it in accordance with the Chaldee version, though they make mishneh to signify duplum , two copies (see Hävernick , Introduction).

- Every copy of a book is really a repetition of it. “ From before the priests ,” i. e. , of the law which lies before the priests or is kept by them. The object of the daily reading in the law ( Deu 17:19 and Deu 17:20) was “ to learn the fear of the Lord, and to keep His commandments ” (cf. Deu 5:25; Deu 6:2; Deu 14:23), that his heart might not be lifted up above his brethren, that he might not become proud (Deu 8:14), and might not turn aside from the commandments to the right hand or to the left, that he and his descendants might live long upon the throne.

In addition to the judicial order and the future king, it was necessary that the position of the priests and Levites, whose duties and rights had been regulated by previous laws, should at least be mentioned briefly and finally established (Deu 18:1-8), and also that the prophetic order should be fully accredited by the side of the other state authorities, and its operations regulated by a definite law (Deu 18:9-22).

Deu 17:18-20 And thirdly , instead of hanging his heart upon these earthly things, when he at upon his royal throne he was to have a copy of the law written out by the Levitical priests, that he might keep the law by him, and read therein all the days of his life. כּתב does not involve writing with his own hand ( Philo ), but simply having it written. הזּאת התּורה משׁנה does not mean τὸ δευτερονόμιον τοῦτο (lxx), “this repetition of the law,” as הזּאת cannot stand for הזּה; but a copy of this law, as most of the Rabbins correctly explain it in accordance with the Chaldee version, though they make mishneh to signify duplum , two copies (see Hävernick , Introduction).

- Every copy of a book is really a repetition of it. “ From before the priests ,” i. e. , of the law which lies before the priests or is kept by them. The object of the daily reading in the law ( Deu 17:19 and Deu 17:20) was “ to learn the fear of the Lord, and to keep His commandments ” (cf. Deu 5:25; Deu 6:2; Deu 14:23), that his heart might not be lifted up above his brethren, that he might not become proud (Deu 8:14), and might not turn aside from the commandments to the right hand or to the left, that he and his descendants might live long upon the throne.

In addition to the judicial order and the future king, it was necessary that the position of the priests and Levites, whose duties and rights had been regulated by previous laws, should at least be mentioned briefly and finally established (Deu 18:1-8), and also that the prophetic order should be fully accredited by the side of the other state authorities, and its operations regulated by a definite law (Deu 18:9-22).

Deu 17:18-20 And thirdly , instead of hanging his heart upon these earthly things, when he at upon his royal throne he was to have a copy of the law written out by the Levitical priests, that he might keep the law by him, and read therein all the days of his life. כּתב does not involve writing with his own hand ( Philo ), but simply having it written. הזּאת התּורה משׁנה does not mean τὸ δευτερονόμιον τοῦτο (lxx), “this repetition of the law,” as הזּאת cannot stand for הזּה; but a copy of this law, as most of the Rabbins correctly explain it in accordance with the Chaldee version, though they make mishneh to signify duplum , two copies (see Hävernick , Introduction).

- Every copy of a book is really a repetition of it. “ From before the priests ,” i. e. , of the law which lies before the priests or is kept by them. The object of the daily reading in the law ( Deu 17:19 and Deu 17:20) was “ to learn the fear of the Lord, and to keep His commandments ” (cf. Deu 5:25; Deu 6:2; Deu 14:23), that his heart might not be lifted up above his brethren, that he might not become proud (Deu 8:14), and might not turn aside from the commandments to the right hand or to the left, that he and his descendants might live long upon the throne.

In addition to the judicial order and the future king, it was necessary that the position of the priests and Levites, whose duties and rights had been regulated by previous laws, should at least be mentioned briefly and finally established (Deu 18:1-8), and also that the prophetic order should be fully accredited by the side of the other state authorities, and its operations regulated by a definite law (Deu 18:9-22).

Deu 18:1-2 The Rights of the Priests and Levites. - With reference to these, Moses repeats verbatim from Num 18:20, Num 18:23-24, the essential part of the rule laid down in Num 18: “ The priests the Levites, the whole tribe of Levi, shall have no part nor inheritance with Israel . ” “All the tribe of Levi” includes the priests and Levites. They were to eat the “firings of Jehovah and His inheritance,” as described in detail in Num 18.

The inheritance of Jehovah consisted of the holy gifts as well as the sacrifices, i. e. , the tithes, firstlings, and first-fruits. Moses felt it to be superfluous to enumerate these gifts one by one from the previous laws, and also to describe the mode of their application, or define how much belonged to the priests and how much to the Levites. However true it may be that the author assigns all these gifts to the Levites generally, the conclusion drawn from this, viz.

, that he was not acquainted with any distinction between priests and Levites, but placed the Levites entirely on a par with the priests, is quite a false one. For, apart from the evident distinction between the priests and Levites in Deu 18:1, where there would be no meaning in the clause, “all the tribe of Levi,” if the Levites were identical with the priests, the distinction is recognised and asserted as clearly as possible in what follows, when a portion of the slain-offerings is allotted to the priests in Deu 18:3-5, whilst in Deu 18:6-8 the Levite is allowed to join in eating the altar gifts, if he come to the place of the sanctuary and perform service there.

The repetition in Deu 18:2 is an emphatic confirmation: “ As He hath said unto them: ” as in Deu 10:9.

Deu 18:1-2 The Rights of the Priests and Levites. - With reference to these, Moses repeats verbatim from Num 18:20, Num 18:23-24, the essential part of the rule laid down in Num 18: “ The priests the Levites, the whole tribe of Levi, shall have no part nor inheritance with Israel . ” “All the tribe of Levi” includes the priests and Levites. They were to eat the “firings of Jehovah and His inheritance,” as described in detail in Num 18.

The inheritance of Jehovah consisted of the holy gifts as well as the sacrifices, i. e. , the tithes, firstlings, and first-fruits. Moses felt it to be superfluous to enumerate these gifts one by one from the previous laws, and also to describe the mode of their application, or define how much belonged to the priests and how much to the Levites. However true it may be that the author assigns all these gifts to the Levites generally, the conclusion drawn from this, viz.

, that he was not acquainted with any distinction between priests and Levites, but placed the Levites entirely on a par with the priests, is quite a false one. For, apart from the evident distinction between the priests and Levites in Deu 18:1, where there would be no meaning in the clause, “all the tribe of Levi,” if the Levites were identical with the priests, the distinction is recognised and asserted as clearly as possible in what follows, when a portion of the slain-offerings is allotted to the priests in Deu 18:3-5, whilst in Deu 18:6-8 the Levite is allowed to join in eating the altar gifts, if he come to the place of the sanctuary and perform service there.

The repetition in Deu 18:2 is an emphatic confirmation: “ As He hath said unto them: ” as in Deu 10:9.

Deu 18:3-5 “ This shall be the right of the priests on the part of the people, on the part of those who slaughter slain-offerings, whether ox or sheep; he (the offerer) shall give the priest the shoulder, the cheek, and the stomach . ” הזּרע, the shoulder, i. e. , the front leg; see Num 6:19. הקּבה, the rough stomach, τὸ ἤνιστρον (lxx), i. e. , the fourth stomach of ruminant animals, in which the digestion of the food is completed; Lat.

omasus or abomasus , though the Vulgate has ventriculus here. On the choice of these three pieces in particular, Münster and Fagius observe that “the sheep possesses three principal parts, the head, the feet, and the trunk; and of each of these some portion was to be given to the priest who officiated” “Of each of these three principal parts of the animal,” says Schultz , “some valuable piece was to be presented: the shoulder at least, and the stomach, which was regarded as particularly fat, are seen at once to have been especially good.

” That this arrangement is not at variance with the command in Lev 7:32. , to give the wave-breast and heave-leg of the peace-offerings to the Lord for the priests, but simply enjoins a further gift to the priests on the part of the people, in addition to those portions which were to be given to the Lord for His servants, is sufficiently evident from the context, since the heave-leg and wave-breast belonged to the firings of Jehovah mentioned in Deu 18:1, which the priests had received as an inheritance from the Lord, that is to say, to the tenuphoth of the children of Israel, which the priests might eat with their sons and daughters, though only with such members of their house as were levitically clean (Num 18:11); and also from the words of the present command, viz.

, that the portions mentioned were to be a right of the priests on the part of the people , on the part of those who slaughtered slain-offerings, i. e. , to be paid to the priest as a right that was due to him on the part of the people. משׁפּט was what the priest could justly claim. This right was probably accorded to the priests as a compensation for the falling off which would take place in their incomes in consequence of the repeal of the law that every animal was to be slaughtered at the sanctuary as a sacrifice (Lev 17; ; vid.

, Deu 12:15.) The only thing that admits of dispute is, whether this gift was to be presented from every animal that was slaughtered at home for private use, or only from those which were slaughtered for sacrificial meals, and therefore at the place of the sanctuary. Against the former view, for which appeal is made to Philo, Josephus (Ant. iv. 4, 4), and the Talmud, we may adduce not only “the difficulty of carrying out such a plan” (was every Israelite who slaughtered an ox, a sheep, or a goat to carry the pieces mentioned to the priests’ town, which might be many miles away, or were the priests to appoint persons to collect them?)

, but the general use of the words זבח זבח. The noun זבח always signifies either slaughtering for a sacrificial meal or a slain sacrifice, and the verb זבח is never applied to ordinary slaughtering (for which שׁחט is the verb used), except in Deu 12:15 and Deu 12:21 in connection with the repeal of the law that every slaughtering was to be a שׁלמים זבח (Lev 17:5); and there the use of the word זבח, instead of שׁחט, may be accounted for from the allusion to this particular law.

At the same time, the Jewish tradition is probably right, when it understands by the הזּבח זבחי in this verse, κατ' ïé̓͂êïí èṍåéí åõ̓ù÷é́áò å̔́íåêá ( Josephus ), or ἔξω τοῦ βωμοῦ θυομένοις ἕνεκα κρεωφαγίας ( Philo ), or, as in the Mishnah Chol. (x. 1), refers the gift prescribed in this passage to the חולין, profana , and not to the מוקדשׁרן, consecrata , that is to say, places it in the same category with the first-fruits, the tithe of tithes, and other less holy gifts, which might be consumed outside the court of the temple and the holy city (compare Reland , Antiqq .

ss. P. ii. c. 4, §11, with P. ii. c. 8, §10). In all probability, the reference is to the slaughtering of oxen, sheep, or goats which were not intended for shelamim in the more limited sense, i. e. , for one of the three species of peace-offerings (Lev 7:15-16), but for festal meals in the broader sense, which were held in connection with the sacrificial meals prepared from the shelamim .

For it is evident that the meals held by the people at the annual feasts when they had to appear before the Lord were not all shelamim meals, but that other festal meals were held in connection with these, in which the priests and Levites were to share, from the laws laid down with reference to the so-called second tithe, which could not only be turned into money by those who lived at a great distance from the sanctuary, such money to be applied to the purchase of the things required for the sacrificial meals at the place of the sanctuary, but which might also be appropriated every third year to the preparation of love-feasts for the poor in the different towns of the land (Deu 14:22-29). For in this case the animals were not slaughtered or sacrificed as shelamim , at all events not in the latter instance, because the slaughtering did not take place at the sanctuary.

If therefore we restrict the gift prescribed here to the slaughtering of oxen and sheep or goats for such sacrificial meals in the wider sense, not only are the difficulties connected with the execution of this command removed, but also the objection, which arises out of the general use of the expression זבח זבח, to the application of this expression to every slaughtering that took place for domestic use. And beside this, the passage in 1Sa 2:13-16, to which Calvin calls attention, furnishes a historical proof that the priests could claim a portion of the flesh of the slain-offerings in addition to the heave-leg and wave-breast, since it is there charged as a sin on the part of the sons of Eli, not only that they took out of the cauldrons as much of the flesh which was boiling as they could take up with three-pronged forks, but that before the fat was burned upon the altar they asked for the pieces which belonged to the priest, to be given to them not cooked, but raw.

From this Michaelis has drawn the correct conclusion, that even at that time the priests had a right to claim that, in addition to the portions of the sacrifices appointed by Moses in Lev 7:34, a further portion of the thank-offerings should be given to them; though he does not regard the passage as referring to the law before us, since he supposes this to relate to every slaughtered animal which was not placed upon the altar.

Deu 18:3-5 “ This shall be the right of the priests on the part of the people, on the part of those who slaughter slain-offerings, whether ox or sheep; he (the offerer) shall give the priest the shoulder, the cheek, and the stomach . ” הזּרע, the shoulder, i. e. , the front leg; see Num 6:19. הקּבה, the rough stomach, τὸ ἤνιστρον (lxx), i. e. , the fourth stomach of ruminant animals, in which the digestion of the food is completed; Lat.

omasus or abomasus , though the Vulgate has ventriculus here. On the choice of these three pieces in particular, Münster and Fagius observe that “the sheep possesses three principal parts, the head, the feet, and the trunk; and of each of these some portion was to be given to the priest who officiated” “Of each of these three principal parts of the animal,” says Schultz , “some valuable piece was to be presented: the shoulder at least, and the stomach, which was regarded as particularly fat, are seen at once to have been especially good.

” That this arrangement is not at variance with the command in Lev 7:32. , to give the wave-breast and heave-leg of the peace-offerings to the Lord for the priests, but simply enjoins a further gift to the priests on the part of the people, in addition to those portions which were to be given to the Lord for His servants, is sufficiently evident from the context, since the heave-leg and wave-breast belonged to the firings of Jehovah mentioned in Deu 18:1, which the priests had received as an inheritance from the Lord, that is to say, to the tenuphoth of the children of Israel, which the priests might eat with their sons and daughters, though only with such members of their house as were levitically clean (Num 18:11); and also from the words of the present command, viz.

, that the portions mentioned were to be a right of the priests on the part of the people , on the part of those who slaughtered slain-offerings, i. e. , to be paid to the priest as a right that was due to him on the part of the people. משׁפּט was what the priest could justly claim. This right was probably accorded to the priests as a compensation for the falling off which would take place in their incomes in consequence of the repeal of the law that every animal was to be slaughtered at the sanctuary as a sacrifice (Lev 17; ; vid.

, Deu 12:15.) The only thing that admits of dispute is, whether this gift was to be presented from every animal that was slaughtered at home for private use, or only from those which were slaughtered for sacrificial meals, and therefore at the place of the sanctuary. Against the former view, for which appeal is made to Philo, Josephus (Ant. iv. 4, 4), and the Talmud, we may adduce not only “the difficulty of carrying out such a plan” (was every Israelite who slaughtered an ox, a sheep, or a goat to carry the pieces mentioned to the priests’ town, which might be many miles away, or were the priests to appoint persons to collect them?)

, but the general use of the words זבח זבח. The noun זבח always signifies either slaughtering for a sacrificial meal or a slain sacrifice, and the verb זבח is never applied to ordinary slaughtering (for which שׁחט is the verb used), except in Deu 12:15 and Deu 12:21 in connection with the repeal of the law that every slaughtering was to be a שׁלמים זבח (Lev 17:5); and there the use of the word זבח, instead of שׁחט, may be accounted for from the allusion to this particular law.

At the same time, the Jewish tradition is probably right, when it understands by the הזּבח זבחי in this verse, κατ' ïé̓͂êïí èṍåéí åõ̓ù÷é́áò å̔́íåêá ( Josephus ), or ἔξω τοῦ βωμοῦ θυομένοις ἕνεκα κρεωφαγίας ( Philo ), or, as in the Mishnah Chol. (x. 1), refers the gift prescribed in this passage to the חולין, profana , and not to the מוקדשׁרן, consecrata , that is to say, places it in the same category with the first-fruits, the tithe of tithes, and other less holy gifts, which might be consumed outside the court of the temple and the holy city (compare Reland , Antiqq .

ss. P. ii. c. 4, §11, with P. ii. c. 8, §10). In all probability, the reference is to the slaughtering of oxen, sheep, or goats which were not intended for shelamim in the more limited sense, i. e. , for one of the three species of peace-offerings (Lev 7:15-16), but for festal meals in the broader sense, which were held in connection with the sacrificial meals prepared from the shelamim .

For it is evident that the meals held by the people at the annual feasts when they had to appear before the Lord were not all shelamim meals, but that other festal meals were held in connection with these, in which the priests and Levites were to share, from the laws laid down with reference to the so-called second tithe, which could not only be turned into money by those who lived at a great distance from the sanctuary, such money to be applied to the purchase of the things required for the sacrificial meals at the place of the sanctuary, but which might also be appropriated every third year to the preparation of love-feasts for the poor in the different towns of the land (Deu 14:22-29). For in this case the animals were not slaughtered or sacrificed as shelamim , at all events not in the latter instance, because the slaughtering did not take place at the sanctuary.

If therefore we restrict the gift prescribed here to the slaughtering of oxen and sheep or goats for such sacrificial meals in the wider sense, not only are the difficulties connected with the execution of this command removed, but also the objection, which arises out of the general use of the expression זבח זבח, to the application of this expression to every slaughtering that took place for domestic use. And beside this, the passage in 1Sa 2:13-16, to which Calvin calls attention, furnishes a historical proof that the priests could claim a portion of the flesh of the slain-offerings in addition to the heave-leg and wave-breast, since it is there charged as a sin on the part of the sons of Eli, not only that they took out of the cauldrons as much of the flesh which was boiling as they could take up with three-pronged forks, but that before the fat was burned upon the altar they asked for the pieces which belonged to the priest, to be given to them not cooked, but raw.

From this Michaelis has drawn the correct conclusion, that even at that time the priests had a right to claim that, in addition to the portions of the sacrifices appointed by Moses in Lev 7:34, a further portion of the thank-offerings should be given to them; though he does not regard the passage as referring to the law before us, since he supposes this to relate to every slaughtered animal which was not placed upon the altar.